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A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims
J. Maria Glover*
Procedural law in the United States seeks to achieve three interrelated
goals in our system of litigation: efficient processes that achieve “substantive
justice” and deter wrongdoing, accurate outcomes, and meaningful access to
the courts. For years, however, procedural debate, particularly in the context of
due process rights in class actions, has been redirected toward more
conceptual questions about the nature of legal claims—are they more
appropriately conceptualized as individual property or as collective goods? At
stake is the extent to which relevant procedures will protect the right of
individual claimants to exercise control over their claims. Those with
individualistic conceptions of legal claims tend to object to procedures that
operate at the expense of claimant autonomy. Conversely, those who endorse
collectivist views tend to downplay claimant autonomy. In the class action
context, the debate between individualistic and collectivist views of legal
claims has been waged as a proxy war between more fulsome and more limited
availability of class procedures—a debate that has been rightly described as
“intractable.”
This Article does not seek to resolve that debate, but to broaden it. The
individualistic versus collectivist debate about legal claims arises not just in
the class action context but in other contexts as well—a point long overlooked
in legal scholarship.
Taking this broader view yields significant insights. It turns out that
this conceptual debate has different implications for key normative questions
in our litigation system and procedural law. For example, in the class action
context, the individual-autonomy conception of legal claims is used as an
argument for procedures that often frustrate access to justice. In litigation
finance, individual-autonomy conceptions are critical to access. The debate
between individualistic and collectivist conceptions of legal claims thus does
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not point consistently to any set of normative goals, but instead it cuts in
precisely opposite directions.
Two central insights emerge from this stalemate. First, formalist
theories of legal claims provide a poor baseline for determining the scope of
litigant autonomy and for guiding procedural law. Second, they should be
replaced by a theory for legal claims that not only accounts for, but also better
aligns with, foundational normative goals of our litigation system.
This Article therefore proposes a regulatory theory of legal claims,
which has three fundamental components. First, and drawing upon
intellectual foundations of property, economic, and litigation theory literature,
this Article posits that litigant autonomy over legal claims—though a strong
norm—can be regulated in appropriate instances. Second, it provides a
theoretical basis for the notion that the judiciary may appropriately regulate
litigant autonomy over claims, including through procedural mechanisms.
Third, it sets forth a key component of an overall theory of procedure itself—
specifically, as appropriately directed toward regulating litigant autonomy to
reduce transaction cost barriers to claiming. By then operationalizing this
theory within various litigation contexts, this Article demonstrates in concrete
ways how its regulatory theory of legal claims points a way forward on the
resolution of numerous difficult questions in today’s litigation landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
Procedural law in the United States has long sought to achieve
three related, and often overlapping goals: (1) efficient processes and
institutions that achieve “substantive justice” and deter violations of
law,1 (2) consistent and accurate outcomes based on the merits of
parties’ claims,2 and (3) meaningful legal access for those who have

1.
See Elihu Root, The Layman’s Criticism of the Lawyer, 26 GREEN BAG 471, 479 (1914)
(describing the procedural issues resulting from the growth of new provisions in the New York
Code); see also Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REV.
163, 167–68 (1915) (comparing the size and scope of Field’s Code of Civil Procedure in the United
States with the English Judicature Act); Adolph J. Rodenbeck, The New Practice in New York, 1
CORNELL L.Q. 63, 66 (1916) (describing the excessive level of procedure in the court system and
the need for reform in the interest of not only the “bench and bar, but in the interest of those who
have the occasion to resort to the courts for the enforcement of their substantive rights”); John H.
Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions, 9 ILL. L. REV. 529, 538 (1915) (criticizing
evidence statutes as “rigid steel-work” that are “never allowed to bend”).
2.
See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1182 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that a basic philosophy of the Federal Rules is to
facilitate a “determination of litigation on the merits”); J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of
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claims3 for relief. These goals underlie the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure themselves. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, for example, reformers like Roscoe Pound4 and
Charles Clark5 railed against stifling procedural codes that “together
with the sporting attitude toward litigation, frustrated the ability of
courts to adjudicate disputes on their merits” and deliver substantive
justice.6 Procedure was supposed to be the “handmaid” of justice—yet
all too often, formalist “nitpicking” over essentialist questions about
procedure became an end in itself.7
Underscoring the progressive procedural reform movement
that gave rise to the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the
very first of those rules, and it commands that disputes involving legal
claims be “determin[ed]” in a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” manner.8
To the extent those claims are deemed meritorious through unbiased
adjudication, or meritorious enough to move forward in the process
toward trial or, more likely, settlement——compensation, some

Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2012); Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck &
Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?,
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 148 (2009), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-UPa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-141.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ML2-TYLM] (“The drafters of the Federal
Rules objected to fact pleading because it . . . too often cut[ ] off adjudication on the merits.”); Jay
Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 527 (2006) (stating that one
goal of the new procedural rules in 1938 was “the resolution of cases on their substantive
merits”).
3.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 10.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010)
(describing the central “object of aggregate proceedings” as “enabling claimants to voice their
concerns and facilitating the rendition of further relief that protects the rights of affected
persons”).
4.
Pound described the prevailing mentality as follows: “The inquiry is not, What do
substantive law and justice require? Instead, the inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been
carried out strictly?” Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906) [hereinafter Pound, Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction]; see also Roscoe Pound, Appendix E. Principles of Practice Reform, 33
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 611, 635 (1910) (referring to the “archaic formalism” of procedure).
5.
Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 73 (1927); Charles E.
Clark, Comment, Pleading Negligence, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 490 (1923).
6.
Hiro Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1939, 1969 (2014).
7.
Id.; see, e.g., Elihu Root, Reform of Procedure, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 87, 89 (1911) (“Rules and formulas originally
designed as convenient aids to the attainment of ultimate ends become traditions and dogmas.”);
Thomas W. Shelton, Greater Efficacy of the Trial of Civil Cases, 33 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 661 (1928).
For example, Pound and Shelton often lamented how the pages of the appellate reporters were
saturated with cases that turned solely on points of procedure rather than substantive law. See,
e.g., Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 64th Cong. 5, 9 (1916) (statement of Thomas W. Shelton); Roscoe Pound, The Place of
Procedure in Modern Law, 1 SW. L. REV. 59, 76–77 (1917).
8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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modicum of access to justice, and, to the extent a defendant changes
its wrongful behavior, deterrence of wrongdoing can be achieved. As
the “handmaid” of legal claims, the reformers envisioned that
procedural rules would assist the effectuation of those claims in a way
that took into account these broader normative goals.
Since that time, scholars and courts have long grappled with a
related, and hotly debated, question of whether and to what extent
individuals may exercise autonomy over their legal claims.9 Though
not always expressed in these precise terms, this debate is concerned
fundamentally with whether legal claims are properly conceptualized
primarily as individualistic, over which claimants exercise fulsome
individual autonomy,10 or primarily as collectivist, over which litigant
autonomy is appropriately sacrificed in favor of, say, overall
compensatory interests of a group of claimholders or public interests,
like deterring wrongdoing and filling regulatory gaps in the
enforcement of substantive directives.11 In this debate, conception has
9.
See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1066
(2012) (arguing that protecting litigant autonomy values in mass tort context is self-defeating);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) (relying upon individual autonomy
values to prevent principal agent problems); Mark Moller, Separation of Powers and the Class
Action, NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478953 [https://perma.cc/2ZRC28GF]; Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in an Age of
Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2015); Martin Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1573 (2007) (defending values of litigant autonomy); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2015) (cautioning against a collective view of class claims);
David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) (arguing for a collective conception of class claims).
10. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9; Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the
Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1065–66 (2002) (challenging the
extent to which we afford fulsome protection for litigant autonomy); Redish & Larsen, supra note
9, at 1616–18 (insisting that litigant autonomy is the cornerstone of due process); Ryan C.
Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599
(2015).
11. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 661–66 (2013) (noting that at least in certain
contexts, legal claims serve a public function that must be accounted for in determining how to
apply procedural rules, though not arguing for a purely public conception of legal claims); Owen
M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against
Settlement] (arguing for a public conception of legal claims); Owen M. Fiss, The History of an
Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273 (2009) [hereinafter Fiss, The History of an Idea] (reiterating his
1984 argument for a public conception of legal claims); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1141–42 (2012)
(making arguments similar to those espoused in Private Enforcement); David Rosenberg, Class
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987)
(arguing for a collective view of class claims); Rosenberg, supra note 9 (arguing that opt-out
rights should not be permitted in mass tort cases); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as
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consequences: the “appropriate” conception of legal claims dictates the
appropriate content, contours, and application of procedural rules and
doctrine.
This fundamental debate is most developed, feverish, and longstanding in the class action context. In that corner of the procedural
landscape, the Court’s recent jurisprudence has come down firmly on
the side of litigant autonomy over legal claims, with distinct
consequences for procedural law.12 For example, in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court rejected arguably the most
promising means for resolving thousands of asbestos cases by way of a
global settlement.13 It did so in large part because the settlement
purported to resolve the claims of those who had not yet manifested
injury, and the Court did not believe opt-out rights under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) sufficiently protected litigants’ due
process right to pursue one’s individual day in court for these claims.14
The Court’s invocation of an individual day-in-court conception of due
process vis-à-vis legal claims necessarily rejected more collective
conceptions of the class claims—perhaps as inextricably interrelated
as a matter of any claimant obtaining compensation, or as a matter of
achieving otherwise elusive resolution to a massive public-health
disaster.15
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to litigant autonomy over
class claims most recently in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.16
Plaintiffs, female employees of Wal-Mart, brought Title VII
discrimination claims and sought both injunctive and monetary relief
under the mandatory class provision of Rule 23(b)(2).17 A unanimous

Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917 (1998) (arguing that the class functions as a
collective entity, not a collection of individuals, though not going so far as to demand mandatory
treatment of all class actions).
12. The Supreme Court has come down firmly on the side of treating legal claims as
property rights over which litigants should have unfettered autonomy in class action decisions,
see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–50 (2011); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–25 (1997); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807–08 (1985);
in arbitration decisions, see, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–
10 (2013); in preclusion decisions and preclusion law, see, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,
892–93 (2008); and in the Erie doctrine, see, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–09 (2010).
13. 521 U.S. at 628–29.
14. Id. at 628; see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT
77–78 (noting that the Court in Amchem viewed the deal as an impermissible delegation of
power to class counsel to sell plaintiffs’ claims).
15. See NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 79–80 (describing the Amchem deal as a “rival[ ] to
the legislative process”).
16. 564 U.S. at 366–67.
17. Id. at 363.
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Court rejected this attempt to combine monetary damages in the form
of back pay with injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), noting that
removing opt-out rights would “depriv[e] people of their right to sue”
in violation of the Due Process Clause, at least vis-à-vis monetary
damages—though the Court expressed skepticism about the
mandatory nature of the class action for claims involving injunctive
relief as well.18 The Court’s emphasis on litigant autonomy extends
beyond the class action context; indeed, it underlies a broad swath of
the Court’s procedural jurisprudence.19
Class action scholars continue to debate whether class claims
are appropriately conceptualized as individualistic or collectivist, and
those on either side of the conceptual divide seem no closer to
agreement.20 This debate, however, has largely ignored the other
areas of litigation in which this same question about the proper
conception of legal claims arises. Indeed, virtually no scholarly
attention has been given to the ways in which that debate pervades
our civil justice system throughout numerous procedural issues across
the litigation landscape.
This Article is the first to take a broader view, by looking at the
ways in which the debate between a litigant autonomy and a collective
view of legal claims plays out across current and seemingly unrelated
issues in modern litigation. This broader frame yields significant
insights. The debate over the proper formalist conception of legal
claims is largely orthogonal to the key normative values in our
litigation system like access to justice, compensation, and deterrence.
Take access to justice as an example. An individualistic conception of
legal claims tends to constrain the use of the class action procedure
and impedes the claim-facilitative function that it can serve; in other
procedural contexts, like alternative litigation finance, an
individualistic conception of claim ownership is central to the claimfacilitative effects of funding. Across procedural contexts, the
individualistic conception cuts exactly the opposite way. The same is
true of the collectivist conception. Rather than providing formalism’s
oft-promised clarity of answers,21 these formalistic conceptions yield
completely conflicting results.
18. Id. (noting that injunctive mandatory classes are permitted under Rule 23(b)(2) “rightly
or wrongly”).
19. See Campos, supra note 9, at 1060 n.1 (listing a variety of cases where the Supreme
Court has focused on individual litigant autonomy).
20. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939
(2011) (setting out the collective versus individual property views of class actions).
21. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 625–26 (1990) (extolling the
virtues of formalism—chief among them, clarity—in an opinion by Justice Scalia).
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Therefore, rather than looking to formalist conceptual
frameworks to dictate the scope of litigant autonomy, this Article
provides a new way. Building on insights from property, economic, and
litigation dynamics literature, this Article develops a theory for
regulating individual litigant autonomy in ways that align with
foundational goals of our litigation system. To be clear, regulation of
litigant autonomy justified under this Article’s theory need not be
embodied in the procedural design, interpretation, and doctrine of the
judiciary; for instance, Congress could regulate litigant autonomy
through legislation. However, if this Article’s regulatory theory of
legal claims is to provide an alternative to formalist theories of legal
claims used within the judicial system, it must provide a theoretical
basis for that sort of regulation. Accordingly, this Article also provides
a theory both of the judicial role and of procedure as legitimate
sources of regulation for legal claims; it also sets forth a theory of
procedure as appropriately directed at regulating litigant autonomy in
order to reduce or prevent the generation of substantial transaction
cost barriers to claiming.
Part I of this Article briefly sets forth the long-standing
conceptual debate about the nature of class members and class
actions, situating that debate as one fundamentally about the
appropriate conception of legal claims. Part II broadens the frame. By
exploring the implications of these dichotomous conceptual views of
claims within three current, and seemingly unrelated, areas of the
litigation landscape, the following insight emerges: the conceptual
theories of legal claims generate precisely opposite results vis-à-vis
fundamental normative goals of our litigation system, depending on
context. Unsurprisingly, this incentivizes and generates strategic
gamesmanship by advocates who switch from one conception to
another when it serves their overall procedural aim.
Part III offers a new theory—namely, a regulatory theory of
legal claims. Under this theory, individual autonomy over claims can
be regulated in limited circumstances, and the judiciary is an
appropriate body (among others) for regulating litigant autonomy.
Part III also posits that procedure is one appropriate mechanism for
regulating litigant autonomy, and it provides a theory of procedure’s
role as properly encompassing the reduction of transaction cost
barriers to claiming as part of its regulatory role,. Part III concludes
by operationalizing this regulatory function for procedure within the
various litigation contexts discussed in Part II and to the class
certification debates set forth in Part I. In so doing, it demonstrates
the ways in which this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, and
the prescriptive framework it will (continue to) generate, provides a
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better way forward on the achievement of key aims of our litigation
system.
I. THE LONG-STANDING CLASS ACTION DEBATE
ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE CONCEPTION OF LEGAL CLAIMS
The procedural reform movement that culminated in 1938 with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stemmed in large part from the
notion that procedural law at the time was divorced from notions of
fairness and led to the appearance of injustice.22 Substantive rights
were often subsumed by the formalities of procedure, frustrating both
the effectuation and merit-based determination of recognized legal
claims.23 In response, reformers greatly simplified procedure to
conform more closely to the expectations of “farmers and business men
and workmen,” in the hopes that simplification would help procedure,
as the handmaid of legal claims, achieve substantive justice24 through
the efficient resolution of claims on their merits so that (when
warranted) substantive law could achieve its aims of compensation,
deterrence, and the like.25
In debates about procedural design, interpretation, and scope,
scholars and courts have for decades focused on a related, but quite
different, question for guidance: whether and to what extent claimants
can exercise control over their legal claims.26 Fundamentally, this is a
question about the proper conception of legal claims as either

22. Aragaki, supra note 6, at 1970.
23. See Charles E. Clark, Methods of Legal Reform, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 106, 111 (1929)
(advocating for procedure as a means to an end rather than an end itself, which is a major defect
of common law); see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 962 (1987) (noting that
the problem of “procedural technicality stand[ing] in the way of reaching the merits” as a key
point of Clark’s work).
24. Root, supra note 1, at 478.
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules] should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”); see also Pound, supra note 4, at 404–06 (arguing that
procedure should enable courts to administer justice according to the law).
26. See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 114–34 (evaluating the merits of a mandatory
class action regime); Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–87 (discussing the problems of litigant
autonomy); Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6–24) (same). To some degree, the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure aided in this transition. Under the Field Code rules of
pleading, cases would frequently go stagnant for many years, leaving claimants with no ability to
do anything with their claims, one way or another. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (noting
that “[t]he high hopes for the Field Code were not realized” because the reformulation of pleading
rules caused difficulties “for even the most common claim” and “led to stagnation that interfered
with resolution of disputes on their merits”).
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individualistic27 or collectivist in nature.28 At stake for procedure is
whether and to what extent its rules and doctrines may interfere (or
not) with litigant autonomy. This fundamental debate has occurred, to
some degree, throughout the procedural landscape,29 but it has long
been at the center of the scholarly and judicial debate over claims in a
certified class action.30
Class action scholars have taken different positions, with some
arguing for a conception of claims over which litigants should be given
full, or nearly full, autonomy.31 Moving away from this position are
scholars who describe the class and all its claims as an entity—whose
collective goals must be placed ahead of the autonomous incentives
and desires of an individual litigant in most instances.32 On the
opposite end of the spectrum are scholars who argue that the
collective needs of the class action require any and all class actions to
be mandatory; no one may exercise autonomy over her claim
individually.33
Underlying these approaches to class claims—particularly
those at either end of the conceptual spectrum—is a rather stark,
binary view of litigant autonomy. Under a view that places a premium
27. See sources cited supra note 2.
28. See sources cited supra note 10.
29. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–41 (1985) (finding
that the nature of procedural due process turned heavily on the corresponding characterization
or conception of the property right of a legal claim); see also Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–85
(mentioning other contexts in which the individualistic versus collectivist views of claimants
come up in the litigation landscape).
30. Some recent work has also debated whether the class action is best viewed from a
communitarian or a civil republican perspective. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE x-xi (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the communitarian conception of goods);
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2–8 (2009) (discussing the
ramifications of viewing group litigants as members of a community from which certain
obligations flow); see also Burch, supra, at 4 (“Alasdair MacIntyre emphasized human association
as a source of self-identity and the building of society.” (citing ADRIAN LITTLE, THE POLITICS OF
COMMUNITY 19 (2002))).
31. See, e.g., Redish & Larsen, supra note 9, at 1574–75 (arguing that litigant autonomy is
a foundational element of procedural due process analysis); see also NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at
84 (arguing against the use of mandatory class actions in mass tort litigation on the grounds that
“the delegation made in the [Rules Enabling] Act must stop short of the legislative power that
Congress might wield to alter preexisting rights”); Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3–5)
(arguing that due process concerns for property rights do not alone justify litigant autonomy, but
that separation of powers concerns provide the rest of the justification).
32. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13, 26–32 (1996) (explaining the benefits to the overall group of treating a class like an
entity); Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917–18 (“[T]he notion of the class as entity should prevail over
more individually oriented notions of aggregate litigation.”).
33. See Campos, supra note 9, at 1064 (arguing that protecting litigant autonomy in the
mass tort context is self-defeating); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 831–34 (arguing that opt-out
rights should not be permitted in mass tort cases).
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on party control, an individual has almost complete dominion over her
claim, almost as a natural right. At the other end of the spectrum is
the view that the party’s control over her claim is at the grace of
someone else—a judge, a class attorney, or a rulemaker.
Part A provides a brief overview of individual-autonomyfocused views of the class action. Part B then sketches more collective,
or representational views of the class action. Part C then situates
these two ends of the class action debate within a framework of
analysis about the conception of legal claims more generally, setting
the stage for Part II’s exploration of these dichotomous conceptions
across the procedural landscape.
A. Individual Autonomy Views of the Class Action
Countless scholars have explored the interaction between
individual autonomy and due process rights in the class action
context.34 Without recounting the vast literature here, perhaps the
strongest position in favor of individual autonomy for class members
comes from the work of Martin Redish. Redish has argued that
litigant autonomy should be protected to the greatest extent possible
by the Due Process Clause, not simply because it is a compelling
interest that frequently, if not almost always, outweighs other
procedural values,35 but primarily because liberal democratic thought
demands a belief in the “centrality of individual autonomy” when a
person seeks to advance or protect her interests—one might even say
property—through governmental processes.36
Values of litigant autonomy—the individual right to control
one’s legal claim37 in litigation, the right, if one wants, to a “day in

34. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
651 (2014); Issacharoff, supra note 10; Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 71; Redish & Larsen, supra note 9.
35. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 9, at 1577–78 (rejecting as misguided the balancing
test in Mathews v. Eldridge and in Connecticut v. Doehr as ignoring due process’s “moorings in
the values of liberal political theory” which would protect a “foundational belief in the value of
allowing individuals to make fundamental choices about the judicial protection of their own
legally authorized rights”).
36. Id. at 1575.
37. As Mark Moller has explained, the concept of a “claim” could have various constituent
parts: (1) what he terms the “primary right,” which is the protected interest that the right to
relief protects; (2) what he terms the “remedial right,” which is the right to a remedy for the
infringement of the primary right; and (3) the “right of action” or the “claim,” which is the right
to sue. Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6). Often the three travel together (though they do
not necessarily have to). See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2010) (“[C]ivil law need not necessarily define the scope of the right
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court”—provide the foundation for the Supreme Court’s class action
jurisprudence in recent decades. Specifically, it has skewed largely
against certification in favor of preserving individual control of one’s
claim,38 no matter how unrealistic that an individual could pursue her
claim alone.39 In fact, the Court has described notions of litigant
autonomy vis-à-vis one’s claim—her “day in court”—as the “usual
rule” from which Rule 23 only narrowly departs.40 The notion here is
that a procedural rule—Rule 23—should not be interpreted to
interfere with individual autonomy. The source of protection invoked
for these individual autonomy values is due process.41
The contours of Rule 23 in Supreme Court class action
jurisprudence flow not only from a strong individual autonomy
conception of due process; they also stem from a particular view of
Rule 23 as a “mere joinder” device. As recently as 2010, the Supreme
Court compared the class action device under Rule 23 to other rules
governing simple joinder—therefore, the class action device is merely a
joinder device, merely a mechanism for collecting individual claims for
more efficient adjudication.42 For purposes of engaging in procedural
decisionmaking and interpretation, then, the joinder conception of the
of action in a manner that synchronizes with either the wrong or the remedy.”). For purposes of
this Article, I treat the term “claim” as generally encompassing all three, unless otherwise
stated.
38. The emphasis on a litigant’s control over his own claim is a feature of the federal
system itself. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 91 (2005) (“In general, the
plaintiff is the master of the complaint and has the option of naming only those parties the
plaintiff chooses to sue, subject only to the rules of joinder [of] necessary parties.” (alteration in
original) (quoting 16 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c]
(3d ed. 2005))); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003) (“The [well-pleaded
complaint] rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987))).
39. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (antitrust class
action); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (antitrust class action); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (Title VII class action alleging sex discrimination);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (asbestos litigation).
40. See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363 (noting that due process likely requires notice and opt
out in (b)(2) actions that involve claims for monetary relief); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 839–41 (1999) (discussing the history of the principle in favor of treating claim owners
equally); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979) (“[T]he Rule 23 class-action device
was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf
of the individual named parties only.”).
41. Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 9) (noting that individual control over one’s claim
derives from conceptions of property in the nineteenth century, which “viewed the right to
exclusive use as the core feature of property”).
42. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–08, 450
(2010) (stressing that the class action is like joinder and does not change anything about the
parties’ rights or duties, nor does it bear on the functioning of substantive remedial schemes
despite, as the dissent pointed out, the New York Legislature’s arguably clear view to the
contrary).
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class action forecloses as inappropriate consideration of collective
values potentially served by Rule 23, such as the ways in which it
makes small-value claims marketable and provides the class as a
collective with greater leverage against defendants, among others.43
The implications of a joinder view of the class action—at least
taken to its literal extreme—would of course be absurdly rigid and
impractical.44 As Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals famously traced, a joinder conception of the class action would
call for according precisely the same due process to absent class
members as if they had been joined under Rule 20.45 According to
Judge Wood, at least, such a requirement would destroy the class
action device merely through the expense of serving each and every
class member with process.46
While necessarily short of demanding the extreme set of affairs
identified by Judge Wood,47 the Court has invoked litigant autonomy
associated with a joinder view of the class action in its application of
various Rule 23 certification requirements as well as its application of
the Erie doctrine to the class action device.48 Extrapolating from the
Court’s jurisprudence, a particular view of procedure emerges—one
that ought to preserve, or at least not interfere with, the individual
character of claims and the ability of individual claimants to exercise
control over those claims.

43. The Court did note, in separate cases, that the ability of the class action to impose
settlement pressure on defendants was a negative feature of the device. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664–65 (2010) (discussing the “basic precept that
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion,’ ” and the potential pitfalls of class action
arbitration).
44. Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP.
CT. REV. 459, 491 (describing both potential models of the class action).
45. Id.
46. The joinder model “imposes the same procedural requirements on every class member,
whether representative or absent.” Id. at 478. Thus, every member of the class would have to be
served with process because each “must independently satisfy all procedural requirements for
appearing before the court in question.” Id. at 459 (contrasting this aspect of the joinder model
with the representational model’s emphasis placed upon the named class representative—
allowing the individual to act as the legal representative once her right to come before the court
was established).
47. One could point to the collective action provision under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012), or under the Magnuson Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (2012),
which affirmatively requires members of the collective action to opt in, as comprising even more
extreme positions on the litigant autonomy spectrum. However, since those provisions do not
come under the purview of Rule 23, or typically get discussed in the individualistic versus
collectivist conceptual debates about the class action, it is sufficient for this article simply to
mention them here.
48. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010).
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B. Representational, or Collective, Views of the Class Action
Under representational or collective views of the class action,
the basic notion is that a representative party litigates alone, but on
behalf of absent class members until liability is established.49 Once
that has occurred, the judgment is held open so that absent class
members can come and establish their rights to share in the
recovery.50 This view departs from notions of preserving as much as
possible the individual character and participation rights of individual
class members and their claims. Instead, collectivist conceptions are
grounded in other normative concerns: efficiency and economy of
litigation for litigants and the role of the class action as a mechanism
for enforcing legislative prerogatives and supplementing public law
enforcement efforts.51 Indeed, even before Rule 23 took its modern
form in 1966, scholars identified the class action as a vehicle to
“explore the possibilities of revitalizing private litigation to fashion an
effective means of group redress.”52 This view was reinforced in the
1966 amendments to Rule 23.53
This fundamental tension between the value of individual
autonomy, which is protected and emphasized by the joinder model on
the one hand, and values like collective justice, which are promoted on
the other, continues to be debated in some form or another today.54
49. Hutchinson, supra note 44, at 471.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 480; see also Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 691–95 (1941).
52. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 687.
53. See Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (1969); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98
(1967); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“A class action solves
this [disproportionate expense and claim value] problem by aggregating the relatively paltry
potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (citation
omitted)).
54. For examples of scholars who took stances in favor of placing a premium on values of
individual autonomy, see Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical
Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 5–14 (1990); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials
in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69–76. Others advocated in favor of a
more “collective” approach to class actions. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN
MASS TORT LITIGATION 1–2 (1995); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and
Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why
Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1991); David
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69
B.U. L. REV. 695, 695–98 (1989). For a sample of recent views on this debate, see Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, The Rational Class: Richard Posner and Efficiency as Due Process, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
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Scholars espousing representational theories of the class action fall on
somewhat of a spectrum. One of the most famous proponents of a
representational view of the class action is David Shapiro, who set
forth an “entity” model of the class action.55 This (somewhat moderate)
“entity” model56 holds that the class action should not be viewed
fundamentally as involving the claims of a number of individuals or
even an aggregation thereof, but rather as “an entity in itself for . . .
determining the nature of the lawsuit, the role of the lawyer and the
judge, and the significance of the disposition.”57 Under this model, the
entity, not various individuals, is the litigant—and by extension, one
could say, the master of the claims.
Under Shapiro’s entity model, individual class members are
still permitted to seek private counsel, to participate in some way in
the litigation if desired, or even to opt out (though only under certain,
somewhat narrow, conditions58) in the case of a 23(b)(3) class action.
Overall, however, the entity model calls for sublimation of individual
autonomy values in favor of collective ones. A number of consequences
follow from this conception, including an increased need under Rule 23
for cost-benefit weighing vis-à-vis notice to class members,
particularly those with low-value claims, and a need to limit the optout right in Rule 23(b)(3) so as not to interfere with the collective
functioning of the class device and the compensatory interests of the
collective, among others.59
Further along the spectrum of collectivist class action
conception is David Rosenberg’s view that all class actions must be
mandatory.60 This view is grounded in the normative premise that the
law should achieve the public, social objective of promoting individual
welfare, which Rosenberg argues is best achieved by bringing about
REV. ARGUENDO 85 (2014); Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–85; and Moller, supra note 9
(manuscript at 17–28).
55. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917–18.
56. The term “entity” model of the class action was coined by Edward Cooper. See Cooper,
supra note 32, at 26.
57. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917; see also Cooper, supra note 32, at 26.
58. In support of the entity model of class action, Shapiro argued that unconditional optout rights of members would undermine the substantive interests of the class as a whole. See
Shapiro, supra note 11, at 938 (“If there is a clear need for an unconditional right to opt out, one
wonders about the soundness of the underlying decision to allow class treatment.”). However,
Shapiro noted that “a conditional or limited ability to opt out as part of a litigated or negotiated
outcome may be consistent with class treatment of a claim,” listing conditions such as the
specified limits on attorney fees paid to those who opt out, a requirement that an individual
contribute to the common costs incurred by the class, a cap on recovery, and some limits on
punitive damage awards. Id. at 957–58, 958 n.128.
59. Id. at 935–38.
60. Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 831.

236

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:221

optimal deterrence.61 Along those lines, Rosenberg has argued that the
deterrent purpose of the class action is predominately public, and that
too great a focus on compensation can actually frustrate that
purpose.62 This view, even though ultimately aimed in part at
promoting individual welfare, requires complete sublimation of
individual autonomy so that individuals can collectively pool their
litigation resources in order to maximize wealth.63 Absent organized
collective action by a plaintiff class—and the associated economies of
scale—defendants can wield the distinct litigation advantages that
derive from aggregate stakes, thereby reducing optimal deterrence
and the related compensation.
The collective views of the class action all differ somewhat in
their precise conceptual contours. Fundamentally, though, whether
presented as a representative model, an entity model, or a social goods
model, the driving notion is that a legal claim does not belong,
exclusively or primarily, to an individual claimholder.
C. Conceptual Debates About the Nature of Class Actions
as Debates About the Nature of Legal Claims Themselves
Underlying these dualities in the class action context are not
just competing views of the class action device specifically, but a
tension between the appropriate conceptions of legal claims
themselves. For instance, individualistic, joinder-type views of the
class action give precedence to the individual’s ownership and control
of legal claims.64 Implicit in that view is the notion that a legal claim
is personal property over which a claimholder exercises significant
control—control that can only be taken away rarely, if ever.
Relatedly, (often implicitly) underlying individualistic
conceptions of the class action are strong notions of claim ownership
and property rights, like alienation and exclusion. Mark Moller has
made this underpinning explicit, arguing that litigant autonomy
arguments are rooted in very specific nineteenth-century property
views of legal claims as conferring upon claimholders strong rights of

61. Id. at 831–32.
62. See id. at 846–47; see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2046–47 (2010) (arguing that at least for small-value claims
class actions, the purpose of the class is to achieve deterrence, not compensation).
63. David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 427–28 (2000).
64. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 11, at 918 (noting that a joinder, or aggregation model, of
the class action entails the sacrifice of as little individual autonomy as possible).
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exclusive use.65 An individualistic conception of the class action, with
its implicit directive to preserve as much of an individual’s control
over her claim (particularly over alienation), departs little from this
particular eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of
property.66
Underlying representational or collectivist views of the class
action (again, usually implicitly) is a conception of claims more as
parts of an overall “entity” or “collective.” It is to this collective that all
members’ fortunes are joined and to whose collective purposes rights
of individual autonomy must submit.67 Viewing class claims this
way—as mechanisms for achieving deterrence, for effectuating
legislative prerogatives, and/or, in the presence of other similar
claims, for achieving an overall better compensatory result for the
collective and the individuals within it68—requires a much weaker
conception of individual ownership of legal claims.
Procedural law does not explicitly resolve doctrinal issues with
reference to this underlying debate over the nature of legal claims.
However, Supreme Court class action jurisprudence in the past two
decades has implicitly embraced strong individual autonomy
approaches to the legal claims of absent class members. Perhaps the
most prominent example of this trend is the Court’s decision in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, in which the Court reviewed a
class action and accompanying settlement that sought to resolve all
unfiled asbestos claims.69 The Court concluded that common issues did
not predominate over individual ones, and thus the proposed class and
class settlement ran afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).70
In doing so, the Court noted that individual issues define mass torts—
suggesting that certification of any class in a mass tort case would run
afoul of the strictures of Rule 23,71 and, as a matter of litigant
65. Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 9).
66. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (N.Y. 1856) (“Property is the right of any
person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing.”); Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1054, 1055
(C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (“Property is the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying and disposing of a
thing which is in itself valuable.”).
67. Some argue that conceptualizing legal claims as individual property for which property
holders can obtain value in the form of compensation relegates the public deterrent goals of our
system of litigation to (at best) second-place status, as (at best) incidentally achieved through
compensation of a sufficient number of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–83;
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 900 (1984) (arguing that a private law view of mass tort
claims “squander[s] the system’s resources” and “deprives the system of their deterrence value”).
68. See Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 1060; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 924–25.
69. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
70. Id. at 622.
71. Id. at 624–25; see also NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at xv–xvi.
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autonomy, with claimholders’ due process rights to have their day in
court on these individual issues.
As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the majority ignored the
collective view—and by extension, the collective values—of class
claims, which would counsel in favor of upholding the settlement. He
argued that the majority placed too great a focus on individual day-incourt ideals—ideals that meant, as a practical matter, no one in this
class would ever receive compensation for their injuries.72 At least in
Amchem, the litigant autonomy the Court fought so fiercely to protect
was worth precisely zero to these claimants in the way of actual
compensation.73
The strong individual autonomy conception of claims in
Amchem is now well established in case law.74 It is the dominant
conception of legal claims in much of the Court’s recent procedural
jurisprudence,75 and it is a cornerstone of its class action
jurisprudence.76 Nonetheless, and particularly given that most

72. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. In the end, the plaintiffs to the Amchem deal received no compensation through
adjudicative processes, and the various asbestos companies entered into bankruptcy, leaving
issues of compensation to be dealt with even today. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA ET AL., THE LAW OF
CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 135 (2d ed. 2013); see also, e.g., Campos,
supra note 9, at 1082–84 (arguing that litigant autonomy is self-defeating in the context of mass
tort class actions).
74. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 424 (1982) (deciding whether a
state’s termination of an individual’s cause of action violates due process); Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1950) (discussing the violation of individual control
over claims via an inadequate notice campaign to class members); Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of
Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the “Government–as–Monopolist” Theory
of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491 (1982) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s treatment
of causes of action as property).
75. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (rejecting the notion of injury
absent some harm to pre-existing “property”); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 670,
672 (2016) (holding that an unaccepted settlement offer does not moot the named plaintiff’s claim
in a class action, but leaving open the questions of whether an accepted offer would moot that
claim and whether the claim of a named plaintiff in a class action has any collective component
in addition to the individual property component of that claim); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (making clear that potential legal claims are tradable via
contract for goods and services); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–22 (emphasizing the individual due
process protections for absent class members’ claims that are paramount at the certification
stage).
76. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815
(1999); Amchem, 521 U.S. 591. These litigant autonomy ideals arguably trace back to Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 38 (1940), and extend through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence all the way
to today. See Bone, supra note 54, at 214–18 (tracing Hansberry and its progeny and criticizing
the Court for consistently insisting on a “day-in-court” ideal).
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everything in life is “only for now,”77 the conceptual debate
continues.78
The class action, however, does not exist in a vacuum. Missing
from the debate over the conceptual nature of class claims is a crosscutting analysis of the implications of this debate across various
procedural contexts. The next Part undertakes that analysis by
situating the fundamental tension regarding the proper conception of
legal claims underlying the class action debate within various, largely
unrelated, contexts across the broader procedural landscape. This
analysis produces a somewhat unexpected insight: as a matter of
foundational goals of our litigation system,79 adopting a single
conception of legal claims generates precisely opposite results.
II. SITUATING THE FORMALIST DEBATE ABOUT
THE PROPER CONCEPTION OF LEGAL CLAIMS WITHIN
THE BROADER PROCEDURAL LANDSCAPE
For class actions, proponents of collectivist theories may be
right that an individualistic conception of claims frustrates goals like
compensation, deterrence, and access to justice.80 This argument is
arguably most compelling when class claims are small value, though
few collectivists offer that as a reason for conceptual distinction.81 In
any event, at least in the post-certification class action context, an
individualistic conception of legal claims may often prove claim
disabling.82

77. ROBERT LOPEZ & JEFF MARX, For Now, on AVENUE Q (RCA Victor 2003).
78. See infra Part II.
79. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating the disputes must be resolved in a “just, speedy, and
inexpensive” manner).
80. Campos, supra note 9, at 1092; Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 833–34; Shapiro, supra note
11, at 916, 931.
81. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 9, at 1074–79 (explaining that class actions in small
claims litigation may solve problems with asymmetric stakes between plaintiffs and defendants);
Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 415–17 (arguing that even with marketable claims, an individual
mass tort plaintiff lacks aggregate stakes and the corresponding bargaining leverage for
settlement); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 62, at 2067–74 (arguing that the purpose of many
class actions, certainly those involving small-value claims, is deterrence, not compensation).
82. See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 54, at 104 (arguing that individual property conceptions
of due process in certain class action contexts are essentially smokescreens for preventing
certification, and thus, any compensation, deterrence, or access to justice for claimants); Campos,
supra note 9, at 1081–85 (arguing that individual rights to opt out interfere with the functioning
of the mass tort class action, and offering a paternalistic approach to those rights—that they
should be limited to achieve compensation and deterrence for the individual, and overall, the
group); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 831–34 (making similar arguments to Campos); Shapiro,
supra note 11, at 935–37 (noting that, at least in small-value claims class actions, the economies
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Across the procedural landscape, however, whether an
individualistic conception of legal claims disables claiming is far from
clear. Indeed, an individualistic view of legal claims that would
support fuller commoditization of claims may well facilitate claiming.
The converse is also true. The same is true with regard to other
normative metrics. As seen in the class action context, an individualautonomy view of claims may well frustrate access to justice,
deterrence, and compensation—as Justice Breyer lamented in
Amchem. Yet precisely the opposite is true in the context of litigation
financing: absent a robust individual-autonomy view of claims,
alienation of claims to a funder becomes difficult.
These binary conceptual dichotomies obscure and confound
various normative goals of our legal system in any number of
procedural contexts. They include, but are not limited to, attorneys’
fiduciary duties to claimants that limit informal claim settlement;83
judicial review of consent decrees brokered with public actors to
promote “fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy”;84 various
procedural rules governing settlement set-offs among jointly liable
defendants with the same plaintiff;85 and rules governing contingency
arrangements between lawyers and clients, just to name a few. Overconstrained by one formalist conception of legal claims or another, all
of these doctrines struggle to identify the appropriate balance between
the near-absolute form of litigant autonomy required by
individualistic conceptions and the near-absolute permission to
interfere with that autonomy permitted by collectivist conceptions.
The conceptual debates tend to occur within the confines of
procedural silos. This Part takes a broader view. It focuses for the first
time on three seemingly unrelated and important controversies in
modern litigation: offers to settle with named plaintiffs precertification of a class under Rule 68, alternative litigation financing,
of scale achieved through the certification of a class outweigh the individual benefits of
autonomous actions such as opting out).
83. See Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing
attorneys’ fiduciary duty to their clients when negotiating settlements).
84. “When reviewing a proposed consent decree, the trial court is to review the settlement
for fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.” EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 666 F.3d 1170,
1172 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing lower court’s rejection of motion for approval of consent decree).
85. For instance, the Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act provides that if a
plaintiff settles with Defendant A and proceeds against Defendant B, the second recovery is
offset by the percentage that Defendant A was found liable for, even if that would have been
more than what the plaintiff actually recovered. In contrast, for instance, the New York rule
provides that the second settlement or verdict will be offset by only the absolute amount
Defendant A settled for. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 2007). The California rule
provides that the second settlement will be offset by whichever of the former two is the smallest
amount. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 2012).
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and mandatory arbitration agreements in individual consumer and
employment contracts. What this broader analysis reveals is this: at a
systemic level, debating between binary conceptions of legal claims
fails to point a coherent way forward for procedure to achieve any
number of fundamental goals of our litigation system.
A. Rule 68 Offers to Settle with
the Named Class Plaintiff Pre-certification
Moving just beyond the world of certified class actions lies a
problem at the intersection of not-yet certified class actions and Rule
68 offers to settle. In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, decided this term,
the Supreme Court grappled with the question of whether a
defendant’s unaccepted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of
settlement to the named plaintiff in a putative class—a class yet to be
certified—moots both the named plaintiff’s claim and the claims of the
class members as well.86 By way of background: When a class
complaint is filed, the complaint must identify one or more named
plaintiffs. A class action may not proceed without a named plaintiff.87
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 then requires the court to analyze,
for purposes of certification, whether that named plaintiff is an
adequate representative of the class and whether that plaintiff’s
claims are typical of those of the absent class members.
Since the advent of Rule 23 in 1966, defense counsel have
employed any number of strategies to defeat class certification. Most
of those strategies involve arguments, grounded in individualistic
conceptions of claims, that the requirements of Rule 23 are not
satisfied. More recently, defendants have turned to Rule 68, which
permits defendants to make settlement offers to plaintiffs. The
strategic gambit is this: in the context of putative class actions,
defendants attempt to entice the named plaintiff to settle under Rule
68, with the hopes that (1) the settlement (or even offer of settlement)
will render the claims of remaining class members moot, and (2) that
remaining class members will be unable to continue their suit
86. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669–70 (2016).
87. Continuation of a class action without a representative would “jettison the last vestiges
of the case-or-controversy requirement . . . .” Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
“Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that a plaintiff with a personal stake in the dispute
be present at all times in the litigation.” David Hill Koysza, Note, Preventing Defendants from
Mooting Class Actions by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs, 53 DUKE L.J. 781, 798–99 (2003) (noting
a logical solution to a named plaintiff being picked off is to find a substitute); see also Howe v.
Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Class representatives must have a personal
stake in the outcome of the case at the time the district court rules on class certification in order
to prevent mootness of the action.”).
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elsewhere—given that it can be time-consuming and expensive to
replace the initial named plaintiff in a class action.88 Defendants’
gambit is potentially attractive for the named plaintiff: with the
leverage of the class behind him, the named plaintiff may well be able
to capitalize on defendants’ broader strategic aims in the form of a
settlement premium on his own claim.
The particular instantiation of this problem involved in
Campbell-Ewald arose after the named plaintiff received an
unsolicited text message and filed a class claim against CampbellEwald Company alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991.89 Pursuant to Rule 68, the defendant offered
the plaintiff $1,503 for “each unsolicited text message,” costs, and a
stipulation to an injunction.90 This settlement offer exceeded, by three
dollars, the statutory maximum awardable for unsolicited text
messages91—arguably not much of a premium as a matter of the
underlying substantive law (and perhaps a poor strategic move by the
defendant, in the end). However, even though the named plaintiff had
not yet accepted the settlement offer, the defendant rightly noted that
the offered amount constituted “complete relief” for the named
plaintiff under the statute. Therefore, the defendant argued, the offer
of “complete relief” made the case moot and deprived the lower court
of jurisdiction over the entire case.92
The defendant’s two principal arguments were driven by an
individualistic view of claims. First, the defendant argued that the
named plaintiff should not be prevented from exchanging his claim for
compensation simply because he is part of a putative class. Second,
the defendant argued that when a named plaintiff is offered full
compensation for his claim, there is no property left to exchange, and
thus, no remaining interest in the lawsuit.93 Driving that second
argument is the individualistic conception claims that the defendant
proffered: the named plaintiff’s only interest in his claim is individual
compensation, and that interest was extinguished once the defendant
made an offer of complete relief.

88. Koysza, supra note 87, at 798–99.
89. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663 (No. 14-857), 2015 WL
4397132, at *2; Brief for the Respondent at 7, Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663 (No. 14-857), 2015
WL 5064005, at *7.
90. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 6–7; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 9.
91. The statute provides five hundred dollars for each violation and the possibility of treble
damages if there is a knowing and willful violation. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 3, 7.
92. Id. at 10–11.
93. Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 26–35.
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The defendant also explicitly urged the Court to reject
collectivist views of legal claims. First, the defendant asserted that the
named plaintiff “lack[ed] any personal interest in representing others
in this action”94 and thus there was no “‘real need’ for the court to
exercise its judicial power.”95 Second, the defendant characterized the
named plaintiff’s possible collective interests either in helping the
class vindicate claims or in achieving deterrence as unrelated to the
nature of claims; instead, those interests were mere “ancillary
procedural right[s]” that were “extinguished” when the defendant
made an offer of complete relief.96 Third, as an alternative argument,
the defendant urged the Court to keep any collective conceptions of
claims firmly within the boundaries of the class action universe,
arguing that any such interests vis-à-vis putative class members were
inconsequential to the mootness analysis because class certification
had not yet occurred.97
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the Solicitor General, unsurprisingly,
adopted a more collective view of the named plaintiff’s claim; both also
vigorously contested the individual-autonomy framing of the claim by
the defendant. First, Gomez argued that part of the interest for a
named plaintiff in his putative class claim is a collective one—of
recovery for the class, even at the expense of immediate relief to
himself.98 The government similarly linked the named plaintiff’s
interest in his claim with those of the class—namely those involving
the economies of scale achieved for the group via the class device.99
Second, Gomez argued that an individualistic conception of claims
would allow defendants to “pick off” class representatives,100 thereby
forcing remaining claimants to go it alone, often an uneconomical
choice given the high costs of litigation.101

94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 28 (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,
133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013)).
95. Id. at 16 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 28 (“Thus, when Plaintiff’s individual claim became moot, the absent class
members were not parties to the lawsuit and had no legal status.”).
98. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 34 (“But it is the very nature of
representative litigation for the lead plaintiff to pursue recovery for the class—even if that comes
at some cost or delay to his personal recovery.”).
99. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, CampbellEwald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (No. 14-857), 2015 WL 5138588, at *20.
100. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 38; see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 99, at 19 (“[R]equiring multiple plaintiffs to
bring separate actions, which effectively could be ‘picked off’ by . . . defendant[ ] . . . would
frustrate the objectives of class actions . . . .”).
101. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 41.
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The Court rejected the defendant’s mootness argument, but not
necessarily its conception of legal claims—it left that question
unanswered. Instead, the Court based its holding on the fact that the
named plaintiff had not yet accepted the defendant’s settlement offer.
Because the settlement offer was just that and no more—an
unaccepted offer, unsupported by any binding judgment or even a
guarantee that the offer would not be rescinded by the defendant at
any moment—it did not moot claims.
Because the Court declined to address the more difficult
questions raised by the parties’ diametrically opposite conceptions of
legal claims, the state of the law on the pick-off settlement issue
remains largely uncertain. Indeed, would the mootness analysis
change if the defendant actually deposited the funds with the Court,
thus avoiding the possibility that the offer could be withdrawn?
Alternatively, do the named plaintiff’s collective interests in
representing a class affect the conception of his claim such that
mootness is avoided even if the named plaintiff receives full
compensatory relief?
The theoretical questions about the nature of named plaintiffs’
claims and the relationship between the named plaintiff and the
absent class members pre-certification do not only go unanswered in
Campbell-Ewald.102 Although the literature is robust regarding the
relationship between the named plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of
class members post-certification and, relatedly, with regard to the
individual or collective nature of a class plaintiff’s claim,103 whether a
named plaintiff’s claims or the plaintiff himself bears some
relationship to the rest of the class claims or class plaintiffs precertification has not been explored.
Here, it is difficult to achieve coherence between the
“appropriate” conception of legal claims and the normative purposes of
our litigation system. An individualistic view of claims enables the
named plaintiff to alienate his claim and obtain compensation,
perhaps more compensation than he could obtain individually, given
his ability to leverage the class for his own gain. For remaining class
members, however, a view of claims that affords the named plaintiff
full autonomy over his own claim may well impede the effectuation of
their claims, thereby frustrating goals of access to justice and

102. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663 (No. 14-857),
2015 WL 241891, at *i (presenting the question, which was left unanswered by the Court, if the
fact that a plaintiff has asserted a class claim has an effect on if that plaintiff’s case becomes
moot when plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on his claim).
103. See supra Part I.
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compensation for those plaintiffs and frustrating goals of deterrence
achievable through group litigation.
A collective view of legal claims also presents difficulties. At
first blush, viewing a legal claim as a mechanism for achieving
collective goals may seem conceptually justified here, as has been
argued in the post-certification context,104 and perhaps normatively
justified as well. However appropriate (or not) that collective
conception is in the post-certification context, it is problematic in the
pre-certification context. For one, though the named plaintiff is listed
on a class complaint, until the class is certified, his claim is still
untethered to any other claim; if there is an “entity,”105 it does not yet
exist—a conceptual point the Campbell-Ewald defendant made in its
brief. Largely missing from the defendant’s brief—which primarily
offered its own formalist account of claims as justification for a
mootness holding—are arguments about the undesirable normative
consequences that a strong collectivist view of pre-certification class
claims would generate. And untethered from a formal entity, that
claim conception—and its implications for claims involving mass
harm—has no principled limit; any claims stemming from related
conduct by a common defendant could now impose collectivist duties
and responsibilities on claimholders vis-à-vis control over their claims.
Now, whether to adopt an individualistic or collectivist view of
legal claims cuts in opposite directions within this same procedural
context: Access to justice for whom? Compensation for whom?
Claiming for whom?
Moreover, even if the Court declared, based upon the particular
considerations at work in the Rule 68 pick-off context, that the
collectivist view is the theoretically appropriate conception of legal
claims, that decision would send shock waves through the system. As
the next Section discusses, the individual autonomy conception of
claims has a wholly different normative valence in the context of
alternative litigation finance. In that context, the road to greater
access to justice, compensation, and deterrence (at least if one accepts
the argument that deterrence flows from compensation) is paved with
money to fund one’s suit. The ability to obtain third-party funding for
litigation, however, largely demands a view of legal claims as
individual pieces of property—commodities even—over which
claimants exercise a great deal of control.

104. See supra Part I.
105. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917 (stating a class action should be viewed as an
“entity” and not as an “ ‘aggregation’ of individuals”).
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B. Limitations on Alternative Litigation Financing Arrangements
Alternative litigation finance, also referred to as third-party
litigation funding, is “a group of funding methods that rely on funds
from insurance markets or capital markets instead of, or in addition
to, a litigant’s own funds.”106 Undergirding the connection between
legal claims and litigation funding is a conception of legal claims as
fully alienable pieces of individual property—property that can be
sold, in full or in part, to a non-party funder who assists the claimant
financially in pursuing her claim.
The emergence of alternative litigation finance is a fairly
recent phenomenon in the United States.107 In its modern form, thirdparty litigation funding enables a party with no relationship to a given
lawsuit to pay upfront costs facing a litigant (usually a plaintiff or a
class plaintiff).108 These non-party funders are typically specialist
funding companies or hedge funds whose business model is to finance

106. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011) (quoting Demand for Third Party Litigation Funding Rises as Supply
Becomes Volatile, BAKER & MCKENZIE, LLP (2008) (link no longer operative)); see also John P.
Rafferty, You Have to Spend Money to Make Money: The Rise of Third-Party Litigation Finance
in International Litigation, PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. BLOG (Mar. 3 2016), http://sites.psu.edu/
jlia/you-have-to-spend-money-to-make-money-the-rise-of-third-party-litigation-finance-ininternational-litigation/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/YLB2-SP8J] (quoting same).
107. The practice of litigation funding is more developed in Australia and the United
Kingdom, where third-party funders have been investing in lawsuits for many years. In
Australia,
the litigation funding industry has since 1995 enjoyed a statutory exception to the
earlier common law prohibition against maintenance and champerty, in order to
assisted [sic] company administrators and liquidators to pursue debts on behalf of
creditors of a company. The industry subsequently expanded in Australia to fund
class actions and large single plaintiff actions as successive superior court judgments
overturned common law principles against “maintenance” and “champerty”, imported
from the British common law. In 2006, the High Court of Australia confirmed the
legitimacy of third parties funding litigation, or agreeing to indemnify litigants for
costs, in exchange for a percentage of any recovery.
Regulation of Third Party Litigation Funding in Australia, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL. 4 (2011),
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/
RegulationofthirdpartylitigationfundinginAustralia.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WQ2-9XLE]; see also
Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1279–80 (discussing litigation funding in Australia). The United
Kingdom has also permitted litigation funding for a number of years. The United Kingdom
abolished both tort and criminal liability for maintenance and champerty in 1967. Anthony J.
Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV.
453, 453 n.3 (2011) (citing Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third-Party Funding of
Litigation: A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312, 318 (2008)). In 2007, the Civil Justice
Council, a court advisory body, recommended against new regulations of the litigation financing
industry out of concern that such regulations would hinder access to the legal system. Susan
Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United
States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 112–13 (2008).
108. Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1275–77.
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litigation costs in exchange for a portion of any eventual award or
settlement.109
However, these modern practices have been compared to
historical practices of purchasing claims or paying the costs of
another’s suit—practices that date back at least to feudal England,110
and practices that, for most of that history, have been prohibited
under common-law doctrines of champerty and maintenance. In the
United States, champerty is generally defined as a claim sale between
a plaintiff or a defendant and a third party for a portion of the
proceeds of the suit; maintenance is the financing of a suit by the third
party.111 The person or entity that purchases the interest in the suit is
known as the champertor and, by definition, has no other interest in
the suit besides a financial one.112 The purposes behind laws
prohibiting champerty and maintenance are to prevent “multitudinous
and useless lawsuits” and to prevent “speculation in lawsuits.”113
Under English common law, claims and rights could not be
assigned, and suits not brought in one’s own name were forbidden.114
As a workaround to the prohibition on assignment of legal claims,
wealthy people agreed to pay a litigant’s expenses on a legal claim—
frequently one involving title to land—through which the funder could
potentially become a joint owner of a landed estate.115 Unsurprisingly,
these claimholders were often poor; further, their opponents were
frequently enemies of the financer. Through these suits, third parties
not only sought to gain riches, but also sought to inflict financial or
political injury upon the enemy defendants.116 The suits were proxy
battles for separate, feudal wars.117
Agreements to fund lawsuits were rampant in feudal England;
neither clerical nor secular courts were able to police them. The King’s
ministers, the landed gentry, sheriffs, and even judicial officials
themselves colluded to obtain money through agreements to finance

109. Id. at 1276.
110. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 64 (1935) (“The
movement against maintenance . . . began as early as the growth of the power of the Crown.”).
111. State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379, 400 (1830); 14 C.J.S. Champerty & Maintenance
§ 2 (2016); 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty and Maintenance § 3 (2016).
112. 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 17.
113. Id. § 2.
114. Noland v. Law, 170 S.C. 345, 353 (1933); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *135 (stating that champerty is “abhorred” by English law).
115. Radin, supra note 110, at 58–64.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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strangers’ lawsuits.118 The King’s attempts to eliminate these
agreements were thwarted by his own law enforcement officials—often
the worst offenders in the collusive agreements to gain wealth through
champerty and maintenance.119
Nonetheless, the abhorrence of the practice by the King and his
courts traveled across the pond. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
described the practice of champerty thusly in 1830:
[Champerty is a practice by which] one lend[s] money to promote and stir up suits . . .
[he is the] busy-body, the deceiver, the vile knave, or unthrift[; he] excites others to
litigation, with an intention to vex, and oppress, and by this means extort money, [he]
is . . . an offender against public justice.120

Implicit in this view of the champertor was a clear belief that full
individual autonomy over claims was inconsistent with a strong public
policy against the vexatious stirring up of litigation by speculators and
other miscreants.
At the time of their founding, around half of the states, either
through common law or by statute, prohibited claimholders from
selling an interest in their claims in order to effectuate them. Other
states, even at the time of their founding, recognized that these
doctrines were outdated and never incorporated them into their
common law.121 Currently, most states—though not all122—have
softened their views on doctrines of champerty and maintenance,
either by abolishing them altogether123 or by limiting the application
of these restrictions to the scenarios in which financial assistance was
not solicited by the plaintiff.124
This doctrinal turnaround, and the rise in alternative litigation
financing that accompanied it, is predicated on at least two
interrelated views of legal claims: one conceptual, one normative. The
first is that legal claims are appropriately conceptualized as
commodities that can be exchanged, sold, and otherwise alienated by

118. Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and Champerty, 35 L.Q. REV. 50, 57–68
(1919).
119. Id.
120. State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379, 399–401 (1830).
121. Radin, supra note 110, at 67–68.
122. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (West 2016) (prohibiting maintenance and champerty in
all situations except contingent fee arrangements); Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 103, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 2014)
(recognizing champerty and maintenance in Delaware); Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 438
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (noting that in Pennsylvania, maintenance and champerty doctrines are
alive and well).
123. Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277–78 (2000).
124. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 725 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(emphasizing that Illinois only prohibits “officious intermeddling” with another’s suit).

2017]

A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS

249

the claimholder—indeed, according to some scholars, that property is
an asset that carries risk and therefore can and should be able to be
transferred either through insurance or litigation funding.125 The
second view is, as a normative matter, that the effectuation of claims
is impeded by the high costs of litigation in the United States—costs
that may be defrayed by litigation funding.126 Litigation funding also
increases plaintiffs’ bargaining power,127 thereby reducing the costs
generated by our expansive system of procedure.128
Opposition falls into two basic camps: those who believe that
alternative litigation funding harms plaintiffs and those who believe it
harms defendants. The former believe that, as in feudal England,
litigation funders take advantage of plaintiffs for their own personal
gain, leaving plaintiffs with little compensation.129 Moreover, those
needing litigation funding are “vulnerable” to unfavorable funding
terms with “sky-high” interest rates,130 terms that should at least be
made transparent.131
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce currently leads the charge
against alternative litigation finance as harmful to defendants. It has
argued that litigation funding creates a “secret” operation against
defendants who are not “aware that a funder is involved in litigation
against them.”132 The Chamber and others have also argued that
125. Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment,
Insurance Law, and Double Standards, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833, 848 (2015); Charles Silver,
Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617,
618 (2014).
126. See J. Maria Glover, Alternative Litigation Financing and the Limits of the Work
Product Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 911 (2016) (analyzing recent discovery cases involving
alternative litigation financing and concluding that implicit in the various holdings is a belief
that litigation funding enables otherwise impecunious plaintiffs to pursue their rights).
127. Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1305–06.
128. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 103 (2010) (arguing that litigation finance arrangements could provide
compensation for those who cannot otherwise access the expensive litigation system); see also
Sebok, supra note 125, at 894 (raising similar arguments); Silver, supra note 125, at 618–23
(arguing that litigation funding is similar to liability insurance and thus permissible and
desirable in our litigation system).
129. See, e.g., Thurbert Baker, Paying to Play: Inside the Ethics and Implications of ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 23 WIDENER L.J. 229, 231–32 (2013) (noting that lawsuit lenders
charge rates so high that consumers recover “little or no money” after settling the case); Martin
Merzer, Cash-Now Promise of Lawsuit Loans Under Fire, FOX BUS. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www
.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/03/29/cash-now-promise-lawsuit-loans-under-fire/
[https://perma.cc/ZP8T-SKBW] (“[L]itigation funding is intended for the desperate . . . .”).
130. Baker, supra note 129, at 232.
131. Bert I. Huang, Litigation Finance: What Do Judges Need to Know?, 45 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS., 525, 527 (2012).
132. Third Party Litigation Funding, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www
.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding (last visited Sept. 23, 2016)

250

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:221

litigation funding will plague defendants with longer lawsuits—as
plaintiffs reject “reasonable” settlements and hold out for larger
payouts at the behest of funders—and with nuisance lawsuits—as
litigation funders bring into court otherwise meritless lawsuits to
extract settlements.133 Still others criticize litigation funding as
enabling third parties to fund litigation in order to harm defendants
for the funder’s own gain—say, to settle old scores.134
Opponents of litigation funding ground many of their
arguments in a collectivist conception of legal claims and present that
view as intertwined with interests of the litigation system as a whole.
In the context of litigation funding, that conception is internally
coherent enough. But that position is directly at odds with the
individualistic conception of claims urged by the Chamber and others
in the class action context135 and in the context of arbitration
agreements, discussed below.136
Putting aside the strategic maneuvering behind this crosscontext incoherence, the important conceptual takeaway is this: in the
context of alternative litigation finance, the normative implications of
an individualistic conception of legal claims are inconsistent with,
[https://perma.cc/7SUX-WHXZ] (explaining that third-party litigation funding prolongs litigation
which hurts defendants who are “forced to divert additional time and money from productive
activity.”).
133. Id.; see also Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1324 (expressing concern that litigation funders
will influence the decision of whether and when to settle).
134. A recent example of this possible problem involved Peter Thiel, cofounder of PayPal
and initial investor of Facebook, who provided approximately ten million dollars to help Hulk
Hogan (Terry Bollea) sue Gawker Media. See Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, This Silicon Valley
Billionaire Has Been Secretly Funding Hulk Hogan’s Lawsuits Against Gawker, FORBES (May 24,
2016, 7:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/05/24/this-silicon-valley-billionairehas-been-secretly-funding-hulk-hogans-lawsuits-against-gawker/#3d3785eb7805
[https://perma.cc/P6BN-GZ2P]. The $140 million awarded to Hogan drew attention to the suit as
well as to third-party litigation funding. Thiel had “hired a legal team several years ago to look
for cases” for him to support financially. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire,
Reveals Secret War With Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/
26/business/dealbook/peter-thiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/CV98-9J78]. While Thiel views his litigation funding as “one of [the] greater
philanthropic things” he has done, others see his funding as a revenge against Gawker for outing
Thiel as homosexual. Id. Thiel viewed Gawker as a pioneer of a “damaging way of getting
attention by bullying people” and funded Hogan’s suit for “specific deterrence” of Gawker. Id.
135. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 17, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09893), 2010 WL 3167313 (stating that most arbitral consumer claims would not survive the “close
look” of a trial court).
136. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a)
(2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5L9-T4L2] [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY] (finding that
arbitration contracts disfavor claimholders, often to a large degree).
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even diametrically opposite to, the implications of an individualistic
conception of legal claims in the class action context and the Rule 68
offers of settlement context. In the class action and Rule 68 pick-off
settlement contexts, an individualistic view may impede claiming; in
the context of litigation funding, it effectuates claiming.137 The next
Section explores this conceptual dissonance in one final illustrative
context: mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer, employment,
and finance contracts.
C. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding contractual
agreements to arbitrate reinforces its largely individualistic
conception of legal claims. Indeed, it advances an exclusive view of
legal claims as such.138 This individualistic view of legal claims in the
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is explicitly indifferent to whether
that conception impedes claiming, access to justice, compensation, and
deterrence.
The Court’s strong individualistic view in this space evolved
over time. Very briefly, the Supreme Court in the 1980s interpreted
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) as evidencing a “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.”139 Armed with this language,
the Supreme Court took a new and relatively aggressive stance vis-àvis the conception of legal claims—even those arising under federal
statutes—as property to be exchanged between private parties, subject
to private contracts, in private proceedings, with private adjudicators.
In doing so, the Court simultaneously rejected collective values, such
as airing of grievances in public courts, providing information about
wrongdoing through public proceedings, and generating legal
137. To be clear, a collectivist view of claims does not absolutely foreclose the ability to
alienate claims, at least in part. One modern debate about litigation financing is whether
customary forms of funding through debt—for instance, borrowing for the lawyer working on a
contingent arrangement or by the client—may be substituted with equity financing, which
creates, in effect, a limited purpose partnership or corporation. These latter arrangements have a
historical precedent in state charters, which are set up to further a private aim with a public
purpose (for instance, disputes over the Harvard and Dartmouth charters). See, e.g., Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (upholding Dartmouth College’s original
private charter, which predated the formation of the state of New Hampshire, against the New
Hampshire legislature’s attempt to make Dartmouth a public institution whose trustees would
be appointed by the Governor). Whatever this debate’s resolution, though, an individualistic view
of claims no doubt provides the strongest case for alienation and litigation funding.
138. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015) (detailing Supreme Court jurisprudence’s shift towards dispute
resolution in arbitration).
139. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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precedent. Nonetheless, the Court for decades indicated that its
willingness to promote values of individual autonomy rested upon a
critical premise: those values were consistent with, and indeed helped
achieve, the efficient, cost-effective resolution of claims.
However, faced with contractual provisions designed by
defendants to make arbitration more onerous for claiming, the Court
ultimately resolved what had become, at the Court’s behest, a tension
between individual-autonomy conceptions of claims and the notion
that arbitration existed to resolve claims firmly in favor of individual
autonomy.140 The coup de grâce was its 2013 decision in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,141 wherein the Court held
that plaintiffs’ waiver of class procedures in an arbitration contract
was enforceable under the FAA even though—as defendants
stipulated—those claims could not be brought individually.142 In one
fell swoop, the Court jettisoned the notion, expressed in prior
opinions,143 that it “would have little hesitation” to strike down
arbitration contracts if they impaired parties’ ability to bring federal
statutory claims.144
After Italian Colors, consumers, employees, and others are free
to exchange any and all potential legal claims for, say, something as
simple (but usually necessary) as a credit card. Or a cell phone. Or a
job.145 Given now-permissible terms in arbitration contracts that
frustrate claiming, however, those legal claims are almost never
effectuated,146 much less exchanged for compensation.147
140. See Glover, supra note 138, at 3058–74 (discussing Supreme Court weighing of freedom
of contract with enforcement of substantive rights).
141. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
142. Id. at 2310–12.
143. See Glover, supra note 138, at 3068 n.67 (tracing multiple cases).
144. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19
(1985).
145. Maureen Sherry, Opinion, A Colleague Drank My Breast Milk and Other Wall Street
Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/opinion/a-colleague-drankmy-breast-milk-and-other-wall-street-tales.html [https://perma.cc/67UZ-RUP2] (detailing various
incidents of discrimination she and others faced while working as brokers; neither she nor her
colleagues could bring claims under Title VII because they had signed binding arbitration
agreements requiring dispute resolution by entities tied to the financial industry).
146. This was the case in Italian Colors. Even though the individual claims were of
relatively high value, the cost of an antitrust expert far exceeded the value of any individual’s
claim, rendering it a negative-value claim and thus non-pursuable. 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
147. Of the 244 cases in which companies made counterclaims against plaintiffs in
arbitration, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found, in its Final Report on Arbitration,
that those companies obtained relief in ninety-three percent of the cases; of “341 cases filed in
2010 and 2011 that were resolved by an arbitrator,” consumers obtained relief in nine percent of
disputes. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 1, at 12. Even when claims are
brought in arbitration, the deck is stacked against them. See, e.g., Arbitration: Is It Fair When
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Here, an individualistic conception of unfettered rights of claim
ownership—unmoored from any other purpose or limitation—disables
claiming, frustrates access to justice, compensation, and, potentially,
deterrence.148 The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence—which enables
defendants to use any number of procedural provisions to frustrate
claiming—stems in part from the efforts of proponents who advocated
for an individualistic conception of claims149 and touted its virtues,150
at least in this context.151 Compensation for claims need not be in the

Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Forced
Arbitration Hearing] (discussing the Minnesota Attorney General’s shutdown of the National
Arbitration Forum for being biased against consumers and for having taken money from
financial institutions). Corporations fare far better in arbitration than individuals do, with
individuals prevailing in about nine percent of cases and corporations, on counterclaims, in about
ninety-three percent. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 1, at 12. Further,
compared to class litigation, individuals fared far worse in arbitration vis-à-vis compensation
and entry of judgments. Id. at § 6.
148. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005) (arguing that the threat of class
action liability plays a vital role in deterring corporate wrongdoing); Glover, supra note 138, at
3075–83 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence effectuates a functional removal of
substantive law from the books without legislative approval); Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C.
Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 807 (2009) (arguing that the
privatization of “the enforcement of statutory rights erodes those rights”); Jean R. Sternlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (2005) (“[T]he use of
mandatory arbitration is curtailing the use of jury trials and class actions . . . and is limiting
public access to our justice system.”); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class
Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006)
(noting that many courts have emphasized that class actions provide access to justice for claims
that would otherwise be economically impossible).
149. See Opening Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC at 36–43, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 08-56394), 2009 WL 2494186, at *36–43 (arguing that the fact that a
class action may be barred is of no consequence because litigant still had a right to their
individual claim).
150. See, e.g., Forced Arbitration Hearing, supra note 147, at 14–16, 151–63 (statements of
Christopher R. Drahozal, John M. Rounds Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and
Faculty Development, University of Kansas School of Law, and Victor E. Schwartz, U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (focusing on freedom of
contract values and benefits of arbitration to consumers in the form of bringing claims and
exchanging litigation for cost savings); The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7–8
(2007) (statement of Peter B. Rutledge, then Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law,
Catholic University of America) (arguing that “eliminating predispute arbitration agreements
would not make individuals as a whole better off”); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against
Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267,
270 (2008) (arguing that individuals should have control over their claims and that arbitration
benefits consumers); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90–93 (raising similar arguments).
151. The individualistic conception of claims was not the ultimate gambit; it was the
contractual provisions it enabled. See, e.g., File a Complaint, AT&T.COM, https://www.att.com/
esupport/article.html#!/wireless/KM1041856 (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) [https://perma.cc/LKG3-
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form of remediation for wrongdoing; instead, proponents argued, it
could be exchanged ex ante in a contractual trade that benefited
consumers.152 Indeed, proponents posited that this individualistic
approach to claims enabled potential claimholders to obtain, say, a cell
phone, at a lower price.153 There is no empirical support for this costsavings claim.154
***
This conceptual incoherence across the litigation landscape has
real consequences. Consider the following not-unexpected combination
of all the foregoing examples. It illustrates the inability of formalist
conceptions of legal claims to achieve either conceptual or normative
coherence across the procedural landscape.
Say that a group of female employees are allegedly
discriminated against at a Wall Street firm. They wish to bring a Title
VII class action against the firm, but they cannot afford to pay the
litigation costs, including hefty expert fees, to prove their claims.
Therefore, their attorney seeks out a third-party funder, who agrees to
finance the suit in exchange for a portion of any eventual award. The
employer immediately files a Motion to Compel Arbitration, noting
that all employees signed a binding arbitration agreement with a class
action prohibition as a part of their employment contracts. Under a
strong individualistic view of legal claims, as has been adopted by the

MP6J] (containing a blow-up provision that requires a court to strike the entire agreement if it
strikes the class action prohibition clause).
152. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013) (discussing
limitations that are in place to ensure arbitration’s benefits); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348
(arguing that “the principal advantage of arbitration” is its informality, which creates a faster,
more efficient, and less costly process).
153. Such cost savings were said to result from the reduced litigation burden on the contract
drafter. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L.
537, 541 (2002) (arguing that consumers will benefit from arbitration in the form of cost savings);
Ware, supra note 150, at 90–93 (arguing that mandatory arbitration lowers consumer prices
because litigation cost savings are passed on from corporations to consumers). But see
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 771
(acknowledging that there may not be cost savings for consumers because of mandatory
arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
75, 93–98 (2004) (arguing that Ware’s arguments about cost savings for consumers are based
upon oversimplified economic assumptions). To date, no definitive empirical evidence has
demonstrated this to be the case. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136.
154. When the CFPB conducted an empirical investigation of the claim that mandatory
arbitration agreements result in lower prices for consumers in the form of passed cost savings, it
found that there was no support at all for the alleged phenomenon. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION
STUDY, supra note 136, § 10.3, at 15–17.
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Supreme Court in its arbitration jurisprudence, these agreements are
enforceable, and the suit is over.
Imagine, however, that the opposite conception of legal claims
is taken—that they are intertwined with other class members’ claims,
that they are also mechanisms of deterrence—and thus they cannot so
freely be traded away like chits of property in a form contract. The
court thus denies the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and the case
proceeds—financed by the litigation funder. The defendant employer
moves to compel the discovery of various funding documents, arguing
in part that litigation-funding arrangements are illegal under
doctrines of maintenance and champerty. Now it is the defendant
arguing that claims cannot be freely alienated. Plaintiffs’ counsel
argues that such alienation is permissible, and, as such, the requested
documents are irrelevant and/or protected by the work product
doctrine. Assume the court agrees, and in its opinion notes that
impecunious parties should be free to alienate their claims in whole or
in part in order to pursue those claims. Very early in the suit, the
court has already taken two separate conceptual views of legal
claims—a collective one to deny the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and
a strong individualistic view to obtain the funding.
Assume now that the defendant makes the named plaintiff a
settlement offer under Rule 68 for nearly twice the expected value of
her individual claim. The defendant knows that being a named
plaintiff in this sort of lawsuit brings all manner of unwanted
attention, and it suspects that few others, if any, would be willing to
serve in that capacity. Additionally, of those who might be suitable to
assume the lead plaintiff role, few have as compelling a claim as this
named plaintiff. A strong individualistic view of claims enables the
named plaintiff to profit handsomely from her claim sale; the opposite,
collectivist view broadens access to justice and compensation overall
but diminishes it for one.
In this scenario, at every turn, the named plaintiff, the court,
and the defendant are at a conceptual crossroad. Individual property
views of claims lead in opposite directions all throughout the suit. The
opposite is also true. Perhaps most importantly, in this example,
following one conceptual road—a strong individualistic conception of
legal claims—ends the suit at the arbitration stage. Following the
collectivist conception ends the suit when the class attempts to gain
financing. In both cases, neither suit even gets off the ground.
Stepping back, what the foregoing analysis reveals is this: the
cross-cutting view provided here offers a new perspective—not one
that resolves the debate, but one that reveals the possible futility in
doing so. Indeed, the foregoing examples in this Part illustrate a
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broader problem for procedure: debates within particular procedural
arenas about the proper conception of legal claims—whether as
individual or as more collective in nature—do not point the way
forward on key objectives in our litigation system.
III. A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS
Resolving the “intractable” debate between individualistic and
collectivist conceptions of claims would lead our litigation system in
normatively and conceptually incoherent directions. However, if
resolving that debate could not yield a sound approach to questions of
litigant autonomy, what can?
This Article provides a new theory of legal claims—one that
can more coherently address the foundational normative goals of our
litigation system by permitting a less rigid approach to litigant
autonomy—which this Article refers to as a “regulatory theory of legal
claims.” Drawing upon insights from property theory, economic
theory, and litigation theory, Section A develops the theory that the
individual property rights associated with legal claims may be subject
to regulation in appropriate circumstances. It then offers a theory of
the judicial role, within the confines of its lawmaking power vis-à-vis
procedural law,155 as appropriately including regulation of litigant
autonomy. Finally, it provides a specific theory of procedure’s role as
appropriately directed toward, among other things, reducing
substantial transaction cost barriers to claiming. That theory of
procedure’s role simultaneously provides the crucial first, functional
building block of an overall regulatory framework for operationalizing
this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims.
Section B then applies this theory to the procedural issues
discussed in Part II and to the class-certification disputes addressed
by the conceptual debates in Part I. This analysis provides new

155. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (referred to as “The Rules Enabling Act”);
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (tracing the
history and meaning of the Rules Enabling Act); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging
and Substantive Law, 90 U. WASH. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (discussing interstitial substantive
lawmaking by the judiciary in “procedural” decisions). The precise scope of the Court’s
procedural lawmaking power under the Rules Enabling Act, particularly in federal question
cases, has not been fully explored or theorized by scholars or by the Court. I begin to develop a
theoretical basis for the scope of the Court’s procedural lawmaking power in federal question
cases in forthcoming work. See J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Trans-Substantive”
Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (setting forth the theoretical principle of
procedural symmetry as one principle for operationalizing the Enabling Act limitations on the
Court’s procedural lawmaking power).
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insights into those procedural problems, and it reveals a number of
benefits to the theory—including increased transparency in
procedural decisionmaking and reduction of strategic gamesmanship
of the sort highlighted in Part II. It also generates, for further
consideration, a number of new potential changes to procedural
doctrine.
A. A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims
Viewed across the broader litigation landscape, formalist
conceptions of legal claims generate both negative and positive
repercussions for important normative goals like access to justice,
compensation, and deterrence. Thus, these conceptual dichotomies are
unappealing on their own formalist terms in their inability to produce
a clear and coherent path to resolving difficult questions in our
litigation system. Instead, they produce directly conflicting answers.
The regulatory insight from that stalemate is this: the way
forward is to break free from absolutist views and to develop a theory
for regulating individual autonomy over legal claims. This Section
develops such a theory and proceeds in three Parts. Part 1 provides
theoretical bases for departing from formalistic conceptual
frameworks for legal claims and litigant autonomy and for adopting
an alternative approach—a new regulatory theory of legal claims.
Drawing insights from property theory, economic theory, and
litigation theory, this Part posits that litigant autonomy over legal
claims can be regulated in certain appropriate circumstances—here,
at the very least, to correct transaction cost-based failures within the
market for legal claims. Part 2 then builds on this regulatory theory of
legal claims by addressing institutional expertise and power for
regulating litigant autonomy over those claims. In particular, while it
seems relatively uncontroversial that Congress and state legislatures
could (and do) regulate litigant autonomy in both substantive and
procedural laws, the litigation focus of this Article requires, and Part 2
provides, a theoretical account of the judicial role and judicial
lawmaking power as legitimately including the regulation of legal
claims and litigant autonomy, including through procedural
mechanisms. Part 3 begins a larger project of defining the nature and
scope of procedure’s role in regulating legal claims and litigant
autonomy. It does so by providing a theoretical account of procedure
as appropriately directed toward addressing the particular market
failure highlighted in Part 1—transaction cost barriers to the
effectuation of recognized substantive rights.
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1. Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims: From Conceptual Absolutism
to Regulating the Market for Legal Claims
Moving from conceptual theories of legal claims to a regulatory
theory of legal claims is perhaps a bold step. It cuts against decades of
individual property conceptions of legal claims embedded in various
procedural rules and doctrines; it also challenges some of the
foundational assumptions underlying formalist approaches to legal
claims and litigant autonomy. Nonetheless, this Article’s regulatory
theory of legal claims is not a radical proposal. For one, it does not
require departure from existing judicial and scholarly approaches to
legal claims as forms of property; indeed, if anything, many theoretical
underpinnings and principles of property theory commend this
Article’s approach.156 For two, this Article’s regulatory theory of legal
claims has additional intellectual foundations in positive (and
relatedly, transactional) economic theory, as well as litigation theory.
Thus, the development of this Article’s regulatory theory of
legal claims can begin, somewhat uncontroversially, with the Supreme
Court’s long-accepted notion that legal claims are forms of property.157

156. To be clear, though, this Article’s theory does not necessarily require a foundation in
property-based conceptions of legal claims to arrive at a conclusion that litigant autonomy can be
restricted, at the very least, in order to effectuate foundational normative goals of the litigation
system. That regulatory insight could potentially stem, say, from an institutional account of legal
claims. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2010)
(drawing upon Dworkin’s work to argue that litigant autonomy and day-in-court ideals are
embedded in the institution of civil adjudication and therefore subject, in scope and content, to
factors that lead the institution to serve its functions and normative purposes). Further, one
might potentially ground in institutionally based theories the notion that, to the extent
alienation and exclusion of legal claims are central procedural rights attendant litigant
autonomy, those procedural rights can be restricted to take account of social costs. See, e.g.,
RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, and Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 86 (1985)
(acknowledging the social-cost limits to the imposition of an outcome-based theory of procedural
rights). Of course, an institutional approach to procedural rights vis-à-vis legal claims might well
justify greater regulation of litigant autonomy in certain circumstances than would a propertybased approach; further, depending on one’s particular views regarding the values, purposes, and
normative underpinnings of the institution of civil adjudication, an institutional baseline for
regulating litigant autonomy might lead to different regulatory prescriptions than one grounded
in property theory, economic theory, and litigation theory. This Article does not take on these or
related questions here. Because this Article’s regulatory theory is designed in significant part to
respond directly to the pathologies of our existing litigation system, it does not depart here from
the property-based foundations of legal claims embedded in long-standing Constitutional
doctrine and the longer span of historical approach to and understanding of legal claims. See,
e.g., supra Part II (discussing the long history of doctrines of maintenance and champerty,
themselves premised on a property-based conception of legal claims).
157. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (explaining that “[t]he
hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state
law”); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Logan for the
proposition that a pending cause of action, “even before it is reduced to a final dollar amount, it
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Two principal rights attendant ownership of property are the rights of
alienation—the right to sell or transfer in whole or in part—and of
exclusion—the right to keep non-owners from entering or using the
property.158 Simple enough.
It is at this preliminary stage that both rigid individualistic
and collectivist conceptions of legal claims arguably go astray, not just
as a matter of the normative underpinnings of our system of
litigation,159 but as a matter of the very principles of property theory
undergirding those formalistic conceptions. Some of the confusion
assuredly lies here: informing the litigant autonomy debate are
unresolved and underexplored notions of property, property rights,
and the contours of property ownership,160 where questions regarding
whether and to what extent alienation rights attach are both central
is a ‘species of property’ ”); N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir.
2001) (“There is no dispute that a legal cause of action constitutes a ‘species of property protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.’” (citation omitted)).
158. Many scholars have written about the concept of property as a “bundle of rights”; a
crucial part of that bundle is alienation. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY &
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 319
(1997) (“No expression better captures the modern legal understanding of ownership than the
metaphor of property as a ‘bundle of rights.’ ”); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of
Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996) (“The currently prevailing understanding of property
in what might be called mainstream Anglo-American legal philosophy is that property is best
understood as a ‘bundle of rights.’ ”). It is worth noting that similar rights of alienation and
exclusion would not necessarily be precluded by a theory of legal claims grounded largely in the
institutional commitments of courts rather than the property-like nature of claims. See generally
Bone, supra note 156 (suggesting that the nature of and limitations on procedural rights derive
from the institution—civil adjudication—in which they are embedded).
159. See supra Part II and Part III.A.
160. Among property scholars and policymakers, there is continued conceptual
disagreement about the nature of property and property rights. See, e.g, PETER M. GERHART,
PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 2 (setting out a social-morality-based theory of the nature
of property ownership and property law as aimed at fostering and governing community
relationships related to property); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of Nature Theory,
and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 2 (2009) (“Questions about property
rights, their origin, and their measure have been at the forefront of serious political discourse
since ancient times.”). This Article does not seek to resolve that underlying confusion, which may
inform the confusion underlying conceptual debates about legal claims. Further resolving this
underlying confusion is not necessary for this Article’s central proposal of a regulatory theory for
legal claims, even as a matter of property theory. Once property comes into existence, it moves
around—through contract, through inheritance and intestate succession, through gifts, through
taxation, and in other ways, including alienation. Alienation typically involves substituting one
form of property for another, so the fact that claims are not original forms of property in, say, the
Lockean sense is not problematic. Claims are things people receive as substitutes for their
property, either involuntarily (through tort, for instance) or more-or-less voluntarily (through
contract, for example). Claims are a poor substitute for money (perhaps the ideal substitute for
property), but they are a form of compensation for property. See also, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (holding that INS had violated Associated Press’s property
right in news stories—which had no copyright protection—by rewriting them and publishing
them in INS’s own paper).
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and difficult.161 Perhaps because of that confusion, or perhaps in spite
of it, formalist conceptual dichotomies implicitly adopt equally
formalist and extreme conceptions of property and property rights,
conceptions that have led procedural doctrine to diverge not only from
normative goals of our litigation system, but also in important ways
from principles of property theory and the manner in which property
law often functions.
To illustrate, take the collective notions of property often
underlying equally collectivist conceptions of legal claims. These
include views of property as having a decidedly public character162 and
views of property as having a collective character to maximizing group
and individual welfare.163 The prescriptions for litigant autonomy,
161. This debate is particularly pronounced in the world of intellectual property. Compare
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1
(2004) (noting the “propertization” trend in intellectual property law and discussing limits in
property law that should apply to intellectual property law), Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter
Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993) (discussing benefits
associated with treating trademarks like property), Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking
Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016) (drawing parallels between the AIA’s alteration of
the scope of vested patent rights and regulatory takings of property), Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990) (“[E]xcept in
the rarest case, we should treat intellectual property and physical property identically in the
law.”), Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property Infringement as Vandalism, 18
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015) (discussing the relationship between property law and
intellectual property law), and Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 690 (2007)
(discussing the historical application of the Takings Clause to patents), with Shubha Ghosh,
Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After
College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000) (arguing that private
property’s application to intellectual property could only occur through analogy), and Davida H.
Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings
Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007)
(“[P]atentholders are not entitled to assert takings claims.”).
162. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 143–299 (1996) (describing the features of a public good). Instead, some
collectivists’ conceptions seem informed by a means-based conception of property.
163. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 9, at 1074–79 (viewing claims as most efficiently able to
generate deterrence and individual compensation through collective proceedings); Rosenberg,
supra note 9, at 844; see also C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986) (noting that property law promotes “cooperative
and productive activity” where individual welfare depends on “effective uses of resources” and
the collective welfare depends on allocation of goods to the highest value user); Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (explaining the concept of tragedy of the
commons and societal benefits from limitations placed on growing population). An example of
such a collective notion of property is in the use of zoning ordinances. See generally Vill. of
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (upholding constitutionality of
zoning ordinance “asserted for the public welfare”). For examples of zoning ordinances, see, for
example, S. F., Cal., Ordinance 22-15 (Feb. 3, 2015) (planning ordinance art. 2.5 § 253 governing
height of proposed buildings and structures); City of Ladue, Mo., Ordinance 1175 (Apr. 28, 2016)
(providing restrictions for fences (sec. IV C)). And at least with regard to litigant autonomy, these
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though, are roughly the same. Heavy-handed restrictions, if not
outright bans, on individual autonomy are permitted and perhaps
required.
However, it is a long-standing tenet of property theory that
restraints (particularly private restraints) on alienation and exclusion
are generally disfavored.164 This is not to say that regulations of
property rights are never imposed on collectivist grounds. Indeed,
courts often ground restrictions of property rights in collectivist
notions. For instance, with zoning laws, the theory behind interference
with property rights is that all individuals’ property values will
increase if no individuals are allowed to, say, construct a
monstrosity.165 Moreover, much of the Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence finds that collectivist, welfare maximization concerns
can override absolute rights to control over one’s property (with
compensation).166
Nonetheless, such regulations are exceptional. Just as
individual ownership is not absolute, it is not absolutely subject to
regulation, either. Quite the contrary. Property law proceeds from
what one might call a “default” position that property rights ought not
be infringed absent compelling reason. So too should any propertygrounded theory of legal claims.
views share similarities with collective views of the institution of civil adjudication itself as being
public in nature, thus imbuing legal claims with a similarly public character. See, e.g., Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Unmoored from the limitations of property
theory and doctrine, though, collective, and quite broadly public, views of civil adjudication might
well generate different, and more expansive, regulatory prescriptions vis-à-vis litigation
autonomy—a question and its implications this Article defers to future work.
164. For instance, assume a developer wishes to erect a brand-new city-center complex. If
one hundred homeowners live in the desired area, but only ninety-nine agree to sell, the
developer cannot force the holdout to do so. The developer could, however, take his concerns to
city hall and convince them that the development would serve any number of city-specific
interests. The city could then condemn the property for “public use,” and so long as reasonable
value is provided to the holdout, the right of exclusion would likely not, under long-standing
Supreme Court jurisprudence, trump the justifications for regulating that right. See infra notes
173–175 and accompanying text.
165. See William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36
ENVTL. L. 105 (2006) (discussing how land-use regulations increase property value partly due to
“scarcity effects,” in which an increase of scarcity of land-use for a particular purpose drives up
surrounding property prices); see also Elizabeth Rhodes, UW study: Rules Add $200,000 to
Seattle House Price, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 14, 2008), http://old.seattletimes.com/html/
businesstechnology/2004181704_eicher14.html [https://perma.cc/XWR5-GQQZ] (attributing price
increase to land-use regulations due to their limitation on supply of land for construction). This
theory dovetails somewhat with David Rosenberg’s theory of class actions: the most efficient use
of property—here, legal claims—is secured not through the facilitation of maximum individual
control over the claim, but through collectivist-driven restrictions on alienation. Rosenberg,
supra note 9.
166. See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text.
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This is especially true given that collectivist justifications for
overriding litigant autonomy will often arise on a case-by-case, or
context-by-context, basis. This is perhaps unsurprising, given a
similar tendency in the property law context. Indeed, collectivist
concerns regarding litigant autonomy will not arise consistently as a
matter of degree or kind across the wide swath of the litigation
landscape167 or even within the same procedural context.168
On the other hand, the near-absolute conception of rights of
alienation and exclusion underlying individualistic conceptions of
legal claims conflicts with the fact that, as a matter of property law
and theory, such near-absolute rights do not flow inexorably from the
existence of property ownership.169 Yet little is provided in the way of
theoretical justification by the Court or in the scholarship for why
legal claims should be treated so differently from other forms of
property.
Property rights like alienation and exclusion are not
unfettered. Fundamentally, the law of property will enforce as
property “only those interests that conform to a limited number of
standard forms.”170 The principle that property forms are fixed—
referred to as numerus clausus—is a universal feature of the property
landscape and stands as a significant limitation not only on freedom of
contract, but also on individual choice vis-à-vis property.171 The
principle of numerus clausus is commended by its purpose of
preventing the generation of high transaction costs by idiosyncratic
property (and alienation by its initial holder)—costs that would almost
inevitably be imposed upon third parties.172
Further, the Supreme Court has, in any number of cases,
regulated property rights like alienation for reasons relating to the
167. See supra Part II.
168. See infra Part III.B (pointing out how collectivist views of legal claims sometimes
advance normative goals, including efficiency—and the associated compensation for
individuals—in class actions, but sometimes do not).
169. Pure litigant autonomy views of legal claims are not particularly consistent with how
property rights are treated as a general matter, except perhaps in a very Lochnerian sense. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (setting forth a largely unbridled view of property and
contract rights that ushered in the “Lochner” era of the same).
170. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000).
171. See id. at 3–4. Though frequently criticized, Merrill and Smith defend numerus clausus
on the ground that, when new property rights are created, third parties must spend considerable
time and resources to figure out the contours of those rights, how to avoid violating them, and
how to acquire them; in short, idiosyncratic rights generate costs, costs that will likely not be
internalized by those seeking to create them—in other words, these new rights become a “true
externality.” Id. at 8.
172. Id.
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public interest, for the benefit of the courts, and to further other
governmental interests, just to name a few.173 Courts have also
restricted property owners’ ability to convert property in certain
situations where doing so would harm third parties or their property
interests.174 Finally, although the Supreme Court has held that the
government may not completely destroy the value of one’s property
without compensation, a property owner cannot demand that his
property retain its same form, condition, or character.175
The regulatory insight is this: While property law certainly
disfavors restraints on alienation and exclusion, those rights are not
accurately described as absolute. So too with legal claims. The next
question, of course, is this: What are the “appropriate circumstances”
for regulation of legal claims?
It is at this point that insights from property theory converge
with insights from litigation theory and positive economic theory.
Litigation theory helps situate the property and its attendant rights
and uses in context. Specifically, and with some admitted differences
(discussed below), much of the functioning and character of our
litigation system resembles that of a commodities market.176 Most
legal claims are exchanged for some form of compensation.177 This

173. The Court has taken a rather loose approach to what constitutes “public use” or “public
interest” for purposes of whether the government can interfere with someone’s property rights.
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the City of New London
could exercise eminent domain in furtherance of their economic development plan, which met the
“public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984) (making clear that property rights are qualified and that the Hawaii Land Reform Act of
1967, which transferred title in real property from lessors to lessees in order to reduce the
concentration of land ownership, constituted “public use” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that it was in the power of Congress to take into
account, in enacting redevelopment legislation that called for the condemnation of petitioner’s
property, aesthetic and health considerations).
174. See, e.g., Licari v. Blackwelder, 539 A.2d 609 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
175. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (holding that the state’s use of
interest from “interest on lawyers’ trust accounts” did not constitute a regulatory taking because
clients suffered no net loss and finding that the state was authorized to use the interest from the
accounts to pay for legal services for the poor, as it qualified as “public use”); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission’s approval of a fifty-story office building on top of Grand Central
Terminal did not constitute a taking).
176. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697
(2005) (describing the litigation system as a market for legal claims); Molot, supra note 128
(discussing skewed settlements as a market failure and providing a market-based solution); Jack
L. Millman, Note, Structuring a Legal Claims Market to Optimize Deterrence, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
496 (2016) (proposing methods for optimizing the market for claims within the context of thirdparty litigation funding).
177. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 176, at 709 (describing the typical legal claim as
involving an exchange for compensation).
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exchange exists against a backdrop of a public system and public
rules.178 Nonetheless, that public apparatus explicitly encourages
private enforcement of regulatory directives179 through a private
contract in the form of settlement.180 In short, legal claims exist within
a system that looks much like a market—a market for claims.
To be clear, this market for legal claims is necessarily limited
to economic claims exchanged (or sought to be exchanged) for
compensation (whether through settlement or some form and degree
of adjudication). This market would therefore generally not include
claims for indivisible noneconomic relief.181 Nor would it include
claims involving subject matter not typically believed appropriate for
alienation either as a matter of property or procedural law.182
The existence of a market for legal claims—now clarified—
yields an additional regulatory insight: among other things, regulation
of legal claims might be warranted to correct market failures. This
regulatory insight, however, requires qualification. Economic theorists
have identified a number of conditions that constitute market failure
in standard markets, such as negative externalities, transaction costs,
information asymmetries, and agency problems.183 The market for
legal claims, however, is not a typical market, in a number of respects.
For one, the market for legal claims lacks the many buyers and
sellers that tend to produce efficient market outcomes: claims can
currently be “sold” only to a limited number of “buyers” (defendants)
by a limited number of “sellers” (plaintiffs). To be sure, market
178. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 19, 21 (AM. LAW INST. 2016)
(stating that res judicata applies to private settlement agreements).
179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
180. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 2 (tracing the history of the rise of settlement and arguing
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ought to better align with that litigation endpoint);
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996) (explaining why, in our system, it is usually better to
settle); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991) (explaining why most cases
settle).
181. For instance, claims for purely injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) are currently not
within the scope of this Article. However, claimants often seek some modicum of monetary relief
under Rule 23(b)(2). See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366–67 (2011)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to join claims for back pay with claims for injunctive relief under
Title VII). Given the uncertainty of the law, this Article leaves specific consideration of these
hybrid claims for another time.
182. See generally Abramowicz, supra note 176, at 722–26 (discussing “procedural justice”
and alienability); David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of
Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 727–28 (2012) (citing examples of inalienable property).
183. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 2012); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed.
2014); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
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conditions of bilateral monopoly (or, where there are multiple
plaintiffs, potentially conditions of oligopsony monopoly) are not
unique to litigation—they exist in other areas, including property and
contract—and those conditions do not stand as a barrier to regulation
in those contexts in certain defined situations.184 Nonetheless, as a
general matter, what constitutes a market failure in a market
operating under such a constraint is frequently unclear—particularly
given that the bilateral monopoly itself can generate its own unique
market dysfunctions.185 Moreover, this peculiarity of the market for
legal claims, among others (such as the pronounced role and strategic
incentives of counsel in market transactions), makes the process of
identifying and defining market failures difficult. Accordingly, direct
wholesale importation of market-failure definitions from capital
market and positive economic literature to a regulatory theory for
legal claims would be inappropriate.
Therefore, as a starting point for designing a regulatory
framework that flows from the theoretical notions set forth thus far,
this Article focuses initially on one well-defined and persistent market
failure in litigation: transaction cost barriers to the effectuation and
exchange of recognized legal claims.186 What constitutes “appropriate
circumstances” for the regulation of claims, then, at least includes the
need to correct this fundamental market failure.
***
So far, this Article has offered normative and theoretical
justifications for eschewing formalist conceptions of legal claims. It
has then offered a theoretical justification for regulating, in
appropriate circumstances, litigant autonomy over legal claims. It has
done so, moreover, without requiring radical departure from the
Supreme Court’s long-standing property-based conception of legal
claims. It has additionally offered grounding—both as a matter of
property theory and transactional economic theory—for the notion
184. For example, after a buyer contracts to purchase a home, but before closing, the
condition of that market is one of bilateral monopoly. As a consequence, there are restrictions on
what buyers and sellers may do during that period: a buyer typically cannot do something that
would significantly damage his credit; a seller cannot tear down the garage. In the world of
contracts, one often finds requirements contracts, exclusive supplier contracts, and requirements
contracts with exclusive supplier provisions—all situations characterized by bilateral monopoly,
all situations subject to regulations in contract law.
185. See supra note 184.
186. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2119 (2000) (advocating for subsidized transaction costs for low-value claimants).
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that legal claims can be regulated to reduce or prevent transaction
cost barriers to effectuating substantive legal rights.
It is uncontroversial that such regulation of individual
autonomy could be embodied in the substantive law. (Indeed, many
regulations of real property are embodied in substantive law).
Congress or state legislatures could of course regulate litigant
autonomy vis-à-vis particular substantive claims within statutory
remedial schemes. The basic regulatory theory of legal claims, set
forth above, is consistent with such regulation.
This Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, however, was
offered in large part as a response to the inability of formalist theories
of legal claims to guide procedural law in normatively coherent ways.
Indeed, proponents of those formalist theories have largely sought to
dictate the contours of procedural law, not the content of laws
governing primary conduct. Thus, the following Parts develop two
additional components to this Article’s regulatory theory of legal
claims. One, a theoretical account of whether and to what extent it is
appropriately within the scope of the judicial role and courts’
lawmaking powers to regulate litigant autonomy, including through
procedural law and decisionmaking. Second, a theoretical account of
the role of procedure as appropriately harnessed in that regulatory
capacity, and more specifically here, as directed toward the reduction
of transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of recognized
substantive rights.
2. A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims:
The Judicial Role and Lawmaking Power in Regulating Litigant
Autonomy
Operating on the premise that claimants are often appropriately
characterized as property holders with certain rights vis-à-vis their
claims,187 one preliminary question is whether it is properly within the
role of the judiciary to regulate those property interests. One
traditional justification for government regulation of property rights is
that the ownership of property is inextricably bound up with
numerous public institutions and processes of the government. With
real property, of course, the source of regulation is often legislatively
enacted statutes or edicts issued by a democratically elected body (like
a city council)—the democratically elected bodies with which the
187. Again, at least as a theoretical matter, one could also operate on the premise that these
rights are “procedural rights,” unmoored from property conceptions, rights that derive from the
institutional exigencies of civil adjudication, and thus subject to some level of regulation by the
judiciary. See supra note 163.
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ownership of property is often inextricably bound. And to be sure, it
would be entirely appropriate for Congress or a relevant state
legislature to regulate litigant autonomy, say, by omitting a private
right of action for enforcing a particular substantive remedial scheme
itself188 or in a stand-alone “procedural” legislative enactment.189
The justification for property-rights regulation by a
government institution with which those rights are inextricably
bound, however, has significant purchase vis-à-vis the judiciary as
well. This is obviously true with regard to the substantive common
law of property and judicial involvement in proceedings like the
attachment of real property. It is likewise true with regard to legal
claims more generally. Indeed, the fact that regulation of legal claims
could—and in some instances, should—emerge from a democratically
elected government body, does not diminish the justifications for
judicial regulation of legal claims. Indeed, the judiciary is the
government body most inextricably bound up with the ownership of
legal claims.
Indeed, at least once a private right of action has been created,
the judiciary is the government institution with which ownership of
legal claims (even those ultimately sent to arbitration under the
FAA190) is arguably most inextricably bound. At a basic level, the
public provides the subsidy for the use of courts and thus for the
bringing and pursuing of claims. State and federal procedural rules—
promulgated, at least in the federal system, by the Supreme Court
pursuant to congressionally delegated authority—provide the pathway
for the effectuation of claims. Courts provide the means for
enforcement of judgments, even those reached through private
contract. Courts enter into judgment—and thus insinuate their
continued supervision and management of—settlements between
parties.
Further, courts have long had the authority to engage in
regulation on behalf of the public interest, partly on the theory that
the government provides the courts. For example, the “public interest”
is one of the criteria for issuing an injunction—a criterion one might
say permits regulation on behalf of the public. Of course, not every
188. See, e.g., In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 679, 707 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding
no private right of action under the Sarbanes-Oxley certification provisions based on Congress’s
explicit use of rights-creating language in 15 U.S.C. § 7244).
189. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (Consol. 2016) (prohibiting plaintiffs whose claims arise
under statutes providing for penalties or minimum damages awards from bringing those claims
as part of a class action).
190. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (providing for judicial review of arbitral
awards).
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injunction actually serves the public interest, and not every public
interest justifies regulation. Along those lines, defining the scope of
judicial authority to regulate in the “public interest” cannot
reasonably be done only by reference to the fact that the public
provides the courts.
It would instead seem appropriate for the interconnectedness
between the publicly funded judiciary and the ownership of legal
claims to provide both partial justification for and boundaries of the
judicial role in regulating legal claims. Thus, whether regulating
ownership of legal claims or other forms of property, the definition of
what constitutes the “public interest” ought to derive from—and not
extend beyond—the functions, institutional concerns, and normative
commitments of the judiciary and the exigencies of civil
adjudication.191 Thus, identification of a public interest related, say, to
the operation or character of the courts is appropriately the basis for
judicial regulation;192 invocation of unrelated public interests might
well constitute an inappropriate judicial exercise of regulatory
power.193
That said, many of the relevant “public interests” associated
with judicial regulation of litigant autonomy—and, more particularly,
regulation of that autonomy to address litigation market failures like
transaction cost barriers to claiming—are intertwined with the
functioning of courts and the normative values underlying, say, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.194 For instance, judges have an
interest in and a normative commitment to managing their own
dockets; they also have institutional normative commitments to

191. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court engaged in regulation of property subject to
racially restrictive covenants purely for the public interest—for purely social policy and social
justice reasons. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Good as those reasons may be as a social policy matter, the
implications for judicial authority to regulate property rights might be described as intolerable in
breadth—with no limiting principle, what was to stop any court, anywhere, from restricting
property rights for any reason it liked? Untethered from any constraint on “public interest” for
purposes of the scope of judicial regulatory authority, Shelley arguably represented an
inappropriate exercise of judicial authority more appropriately undertaken by democratically
accountable legislatures and regulatory agencies.
192. One can already find examples of procedural regulation appropriately described as
being more for the benefit of the courts and the public than litigants. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16
(governing settlement conferences); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (setting forth the requirements for
class certification).
193. See supra note 191 (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer).
194. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] should be construed,
administered, and employed by the court . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”); infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the normative
purposes discussed by the Rules’ drafters, including resolving claims on their merits).
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resolving legal claims efficiently and on their merits.195 At times,
judges even have fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duties to litigants and
their claims, usually when those litigants’ claims are being pursued on
a representative basis.196
Moreover, courts have unique and particularized expertise in
the dynamics of claiming, the litigation process, and claim resolution.
And the value of this expertise is not diminished simply because,
under this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, judges would be
called to engage in “regulatory”-type analysis when making decisions
regarding litigant autonomy over claims. Indeed, courts already
perform this sort of analysis in various areas of the litigation
landscape. As just one example, courts engage in regulatory-like
balancing of normative trade-offs in procedural interpretation and
innovation vis-à-vis individual autonomy over legal claims in the class
certification and settlement process. As Richard Nagareda has traced
in the context of mass torts, for instance, the process of resolving legal
claims resembles regulatory administration.197 Any number of
conceptual and normative considerations—individual autonomy,
access to justice, compensation, deterrence, collectivist values like
increasing settlement leverage for the class—are at play and in
tension within this procedural arena. Nagareda has argued, therefore,
that judicial review of mass settlements under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e) ought to resemble the “hard look” doctrine in
administrative law,198 which requires administrative agencies to
provide reasoned explanations for their choices and to explicitly

195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (interpreting FED.
R. CIV. P. 8 as requiring plaintiffs to set forth “plausible” claims for relief, thereby injecting
increased merits-based consideration earlier in litigation partially on the grounds that meritless
claims impose undue settlement pressure on defendants and clog the courts’ dockets); CHIEF
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2U8D-SAHR] (emphasizing that the 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure reflect the need for judges to run cases efficiently and to manage dockets).
196. See, e.g., In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig., 985 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (“In considering the fairness of fees the courts serve as fiduciaries, guarding the rights of
absent class members.”); see also Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.
1975) (“Under Rule 23(e), the district court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of
the rights of absent class members.”); Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees:
Preliminary Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833 (2011) (discussing the judge’s role as a
fiduciary in class action and quasi-class-action fee review).
197. See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 5.
198. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56–
57 (1983) (utilizing the hard look doctrine to find agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously when
it failed to provide adequate basis and explanation for its action).
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balance
competing
normative
considerations.199
Nagareda’s
200
prescription (and, in some cases, description ) rests upon notions
that the judiciary has both the authority and the expertise to engage
in a cost-benefit analysis to regulate individual autonomy over class
claims.
Of course, for Nagareda, the demand for a “hard look” analysis
derives in large part from the administrative-like nature of a masstort proceedings generally.201 Perhaps, then, judicial expertise vis-àvis legal claims, litigant autonomy, and litigation dynamics would not,
for Nagareda, justify the “regulatory”-type decisionmaking urged by
this Article.202 But perhaps his view would not be so limited.
Even at the time Nagareda urged a “hard look” analysis in the
context of mass torts, the Court had already engaged in a regulatorytype balancing analysis outside of the mass-tort context.203 More
fundamentally, however, the appropriateness of judicial regulation of
legal claims has support in procedural history and theory itself—
particularly the history and structure of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Historically, the motivations for and the creation of the
modern administrative state and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
developed largely in parallel. As Hiro Aragaki has explored, many of
the same concerns that animated administrative regulatory reform in
the 1920s and 1930s animated the work of the procedural reformers
operating at the same time.204 Indeed, Pound, Clark, and other
procedural reformers were working within a larger progressive context
that sought, through various forms of regulation, to achieve both

199. Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903
(1996).
200. See, e.g., id. at 917–19 (describing an administrative-like approach to settlement
approval and design by Judge Robert M. Parker); see also Martha Minow, Judge for the
Situation: Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2010, 2021 (1997) (describing the various administrative-agency-like tasks Judge Weinstein
assumed in his development, supervision, and management of the Agent Orange class
settlement).
201. See Nagareda, supra note 199, at 948–52.
202. This is, of course, a tragically unanswerable question. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, John
C.P. Goldberg, Samuel Issacharoff, Suzanna Sherry, Tributes to Richard Nagareda, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 1401 (2010) (four separate tributes).
203. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (finding that individuals have a
statutorily granted property right to Social Security benefits which can only be terminated
without sufficient due process protections, and determining the extent of those due process
protections by devising an administrative-like balancing test of private and public interests).
204. Aragaki, supra note 6, at 1975–77 (focusing primarily on the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act as being of a piece with Pound’s and Clark’s procedural reforms, particularly visà-vis the achievement of access to justice).
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substantive and procedural goals, like better access to justice and
efficient and fair resolution of disputes.205
Thus, it seems entirely within the scope of the judicial role—
both as a matter of the institutional relationship with and expertise
regarding legal claims—to regulate litigant autonomy. A second
question is whether and to what extent such regulation falls within
the scope of the courts’ substantive and procedural lawmaking powers
(and particularly, the more limited powers of the federal courts206). As
for substantive lawmaking powers, federal courts are rather
constrained, as they generally lack the power to make common law.207
However, federal courts do have interstitial lawmaking power in
relation to federal statutes.208 Unless Congress has provided to the
contrary, courts have some leeway to interpret and give meaning to
relevant statutes,209 to apply statutory dictates to case-specific facts,
and to fill in statutory gaps—all of which may bear on litigant
autonomy over claims.210 Thus, exercise of this power in ways that
determine or impact litigant autonomy is, at least as a theoretical
matter, appropriate vis-à-vis the balance of power between Congress
and the judiciary.211
205. Id. at 1969–71.
206. Of course, state courts have broad powers to develop common law that may well define,
expand, or restrict litigant autonomy over claims. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
207. See id.
208. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 155, at 1044.
209. This Article does not address long-standing debates regarding the precise scope and
proper methods of federal courts’ power in matters of statutory interpretation. For views on this
debate see, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (setting forth the various mechanisms of textual
analysis of statutory and constitutional provisions); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion,
and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009) (rejecting the notion that all text—
particularly as it ages—can be given reliable meaning by judges, and therefore counseling in
favor of judicial restraint in matters now best left to the democratically accountable branches of
government); Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23,
2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism
[https://perma.cc/EJ2Y-LDXU].
210. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (interpreting FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 in light of what Congress said in the Rules Enabling Act); Wolff, supra note 155, at
1044 (discussing the federal courts’ interstitial lawmaking power vis-à-vis substantive statutes);
see also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 725–26 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(concluding that plaintiffs’ funding arrangement did not constitute “officious” intermeddling
under Illinois laws prohibiting maintenance and champerty).
211. See Glover, supra note 155 (setting forth a theory of “procedural symmetry,” whereby
federal courts have power to interpret federal statutes in ways that affect the operation of
procedural rules as a matter of separation of powers and the Rules Enabling Act, but arguing
that the Court’s current practice of making these substantive judgments implicit or obscure
contravenes the judicial responsibility to provide particularized analysis and reasons for
substantive decisions in its opinions).
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Indeed, federal courts have long exercised this interstitial
lawmaking power to determine whether federal statutes do or do not
provide a private right of action in the face of statutory silence—an
exercise of power that goes to the very existence of legal claims and
any accompanying litigant autonomy. Further, the Supreme Court has
recently interpreted a number of substantive federal statutes in ways
that bear directly on litigant autonomy over legal claims as a matter
of substantive law—for instance, by either facilitating or impeding the
class action device.212
The scope of federal courts’ procedural lawmaking powers is
also circumscribed, but likely still broad enough to include room for
some regulation of legal claims and litigant autonomy. In the federal
system, it is the Supreme Court’s task, subject to congressional
approval, to promulgate procedural rules,213 so long as those rules do
not have the effect of “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing]”
substantive rights.214 Federal courts then have room, within the
(somewhat disputed215) confines of the Rules Enabling Act, to
interpret and apply those procedural rules, even in ways that would
affect litigant autonomy over claims, so long as any procedural
decision does not conflict with the explicit dictates of the relevant
substantive right. To synthesize, and as I have explored in other work,
the federal courts’ exercise of procedural lawmaking power must not
(1) contravene any explicit statement to the contrary by Congress or
relevant state legislature in the substantive right or remedial scheme

212. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013)
(interpreting Rule 10b–5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as not requiring proof of
materiality at the certification stage, thereby reducing transaction costs to the effectuation of
securities fraud claims, now more easily certifiable as a class action as a matter of substantive
law); Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “Trial by Formula” as it would infringe
upon defendants’ right, under Title VII, to raise defenses in individual proceedings against
plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination, thus imposing limitations on plaintiffs’ ability to aggregate
claims).
213. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
214. Id.
215. Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 462–65 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (positing that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is either valid under the Enabling
Act or not), and Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs,, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 409–10
(2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (making the same basic point about the validity of Federal
Rules), with Shady Grove, 599 U.S. at 416–19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (positing that the second
portion of the Enabling Act should be analyzed in a specific comparison of the relationship
between the relevant Federal Rule and the relevant state policy), and John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–25 (1974) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), for ignoring the second provision of the Rules
Enabling Act).
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itself216 or (2) contravene a binding judicial interpretation of
substantive law, at least without explicit change, clarification, or
reversal of that prior substantive proclamation.
For example, a federal court could not, say, interpret a federal
statute that explicitly provided for a private right of action as not
containing one. Similarly, it could not allow plaintiffs to satisfy the
strictures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by using a statistical
sampling of trials if the language of the relevant federal statute under
which plaintiffs brought claims explicitly stated, or was interpreted by
the Supreme Court to mean, that defendants have a right to rebut any
plaintiff’s claims through individualized proof.217 In both situations,
the federal court would have tread upon the separation of powers
concerns underlying the Rules Enabling Act by using procedural
decisionmaking to “abridge, modify, or enlarge” congressionally
enacted pronouncements, whether those contained explicitly in the
statutory text or in the Court’s interpretations of that text.218
216. Shady Grove, 599 U.S. at 404, 410 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (describing FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 as a rule that “really regulates procedure,” and thus is valid under the Enabling Act
and also ignoring as irrelevant legislative history about the New York state legislature’s purpose
in enacting a statute that prohibited the use of class actions to vindicate claims involving
statutory penalties or statutory damages); id. at 418–20, 436 (Stevens, J., concurring) (urging a
more robust analysis under the Enabling Act that would take into account substantive state
prerogatives but concluding that because the New York legislature’s class action prohibition for
claims giving rise to statutory penalties was not embodied in any particular substantive statute
that provided for said penalties, applying FED. R. CIV. P. 23 in federal court did not “abridge,
modify, or enlarge” a substantive right under the Enabling Act). The dissenting Justices in
Shady Grove, not to mention scores of procedural theorists, may not draw the line between
substance and procedure as Justice Stevens did in Shady Grove, between specific substantive
statutes and stand-alone statutes that apply broadly to those substantive statutes. Id. at 443–45
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing on the substantive policies behind N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b),
though not within the Enabling Act rubric of Hanna). I do not resolve that debate here. For the
time being, this Article clarifies the scope of the judiciary’s procedural lawmaking power to
regulate legal claims by reference to the existing boundaries of that power embodied in current
Supreme Court doctrine.
217. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367 (holding that plaintiffs’ proposed “Trial by Formula” to
overcome Rule 23 certification hurdles was prohibited by the Enabling Act, as it would ride
roughshod over defendants’ right to rebut plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination through
individualized proceedings); Wolff, supra note 155, at 1034–37 (noting that the relevant portion
of Title VII regarding the right individualized defenses was not explicit about whether that right
required individualized proceedings and concluding that the Court engaged in interstitial (but
implicit) substantive lawmaking on that score).
218. The scope of federal courts’ procedural lawmaking power under the Enabling Act is less
clear in diversity cases, in a number of respects. One continuing question is what constitutes
“judge-made” law versus a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under the Erie doctrine. See, e.g.,
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 458 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for not finding
that certain Seventh Amendment interests were bound up with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59). Another is whether and to what extent the validity of federal procedural rules under the
Enabling Act calls for analysis of state substantive policies in particular cases. See, e.g., Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 425 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Enabling Act analysis should
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Congress has not explicitly deemed legal claims arising under
federal statutes generally, or certain legal claims in particular, as
forms of property, individual or otherwise.219 Unless Congress (or a
state legislature, when relevant) states otherwise, then, courts are not
bound to formalistic conceptions of legal claims when engaging in
procedural decisionmaking, at least not as a matter of separation of
powers. As discussed above, though, the Supreme Court has explicitly
held that legal claims are forms of property, and it has exhibited a
trend toward individualistic conceptions of legal claims in certain
areas of its jurisprudence.220 Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to
assert that the Court had adopted one or the other formalistic
conceptions of legal claims.221 The scope of judicial procedural
lawmaking power, even the more limited version for federal courts,
thus appropriately includes room for regulation of litigant autonomy
over legal claims through procedure.
***
The foregoing provided an account of the appropriateness of
the judicial role in regulating litigant autonomy over claims, as well as
the general scope of the judiciary’s substantive and procedural
not simply ask whether a Federal Rule “really regulates procedure,” but should consider whether
that rule “abridges, modifies, or enlarges” a state substantive right); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 462–
65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are either valid or
not). Finally, there is continuing debate regarding whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be interpreted narrowly to avoid conflict with important state policies. Shady Grove, 559
U.S. at 457–59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that all efforts should be made to
accommodate state interests in the analysis of whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
actually conflicts with the state law). For a fuller discussion of the Court’s continued struggle for
coherence and theoretical soundness in its Erie jurisprudence, see, for example, Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010).
219. Perhaps the closest Congress has come to doing so was including a “collective action”
provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act, but in the FLSA, Congress made no explicit mention
of a conception of legal claims, and it would be inappropriate to read the statute as doing so. For
one, the history of the FLSA itself, as well as the “collective action” provision, suggests that it
was intended to apply to low-wage, unorganized (non-union) workers. See FRANCES PERKINS,
THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 247–59 (1946). Moreover, the “collective action” provision in the FLSA is
not mandatory; indeed, it requires an affirmative choice by any would-be litigant to opt-in to the
action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
220. See supra Part I.
221. Indeed, just last term, the Supreme Court invoked language sounding in collective
conceptions of legal claims in issuing a holding that, to the extent statistical evidence was
permissible in an individual case, it must also be available in a class case. See Tyson Foods, Inc.
v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (recognizing the inherently collective nature of
certain types of injury and stating that “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is ‘the only
practicable means to collect and present relevant data’ establishing a defendant’s liability’ ”).

2017]

A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS

275

lawmaking powers in doing so. However, an important, related
question remains: Is there an account of procedure itself (somewhat
broadly defined222) that would support and then operationalize that
judicial power?
Answering that question comprehensively would of course
require an equally comprehensive theoretical account of procedural
rights and the related roles of procedure in our litigation system. Such
a task is well beyond the scope of a single article. However, the next
Part begins that larger project by offering a theory of procedure as
appropriately directed toward reducing transaction cost barriers to
claiming.
3. A Theory of Procedure in Reducing
Transaction Cost Barriers to the Effectuation of Substantive Rights
This Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims calls for the
regulation of litigant autonomy to address market failures—and in
particular, here, transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of
recognized legal claims. Building upon the foregoing, then, this final
Part provides an account of the role of procedure as properly directed
toward regulating litigant autonomy for that purpose. Before
proceeding, a few preliminary points are in order. To begin, this
account of procedure’s role in reducing transaction cost barriers to
effectuating recognized rights should not be understood as prescribing
the only role for procedure, either in our litigation system generally or
within this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims in particular.
Nor is it intended to suggest that this procedural role is absolute, in
the sense that it would necessarily have to be balanced with, and at
times against, other procedural roles when relevant and appropriate.
Instead, the following account of procedure’s role in reducing
transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights is
offered here as (1) a building block toward a larger theoretical account
of procedure and procedural rights and (2) a foundational component
of an ultimate overall regulatory framework for operationalizing this
Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims.
An account of procedure as appropriately directed toward
reducing transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of recognized
legal claims perhaps logically begins with, and is certainly grounded
in, the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves. The

222. See supra Part II.B (discussing substantive doctrines like maintenance and champerty
that are nonetheless “procedural” in nature, given that they do not govern primary human
behavior or conduct).
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dominant conception of procedure and of the Federal Rules, oft
repeated over the decades in judicial opinions, casebooks, and
scholarly works, is that procedure is the “handmaid” of substance.
That conception of procedure drove the work of the Rules’ drafters,
particularly Pound, who viewed procedure’s relationship with
substance as one of aiding—not just getting out of the way of—
resolution of substantive claims on the merits. 223
For procedure to serve as the “handmaid” of substance, Pound
emphasized the need for judicial (as opposed to party224) discretion
over procedure, and that
[e]xcept as they exist for the saving of public time and maintenance of the dignity of the
tribunals, . . . rules of procedure should exist only to secure to all parties a fair
opportunity to meet the case against them and a full opportunity to present their own
case; and nothing should depend on or be obtainable through them except the securing
of such opportunity.225

For Pound, procedure’s role in providing a “full” and “fair”
“opportunity” to litigants to present or defend their cases was integral
to procedure’s role in aiding the resolution of cases on the merits.
These interconnected purposes are reflected in Pound’s specific
suggestions regarding the content of procedural rules—for instance,
those regarding rules of pleading, joinder, and trials, among others—
suggestions that ultimately found expression in the Federal Rules
themselves.226
Pound’s view regarding the roles of procedure—and
particularly the role of “secur[ing] to all parties . . . a fair opportunity
to present their case”—are consistent with the role for procedure
prescribed by this Article. For starters, to the extent transaction cost
barriers to the effectuation of recognized substantive rights are
present—whether as a general matter, as a product of procedural law,
or as the result of party engineering of the procedural landscape to
generate those costs—procedure’s prescribed role in securing an
opportunity for litigants to present their cases would seem to involve

223. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1182 (stating that a basic philosophy of the
Federal Rules is to facilitate a “determination of litigation on the merits”); Tidmarsh, supra note
2, at 527 (noting that one key goal of the new procedural rules was “the resolution of cases on
their substantive merits,” and did not intend for procedure to be subjugated to substance, but
rather to be integrated with it).
224. While Pound leveled any number of criticisms of the adversarial system, he accepted its
assured survival, as the “yoke of commercialism” had long since perverted “the relation of
attorney and client” to one of “employer and employee.” Pound, supra note 4, at 415, 417.
225. Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 402 (1910).
226. See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 527–28.
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the reduction of those costs in appropriate circumstances.227 To put the
point perhaps as Pound might, procedure should ensure that cases are
resolved on the merits, not the transaction costs.
Moreover, the law and economics insights from which this
procedural role derived228 resonate with Pound’s theories of procedure.
In particular, the notion that procedure should reduce transaction
costs and error costs229 aligns with Pound’s views that procedure
should both secure for litigants an opportunity to present their cases
and facilitate the resolution of cases on the merits. Moreover, whether
expressed in economic terms (as transaction and error costs) or in
procedural terms (as opportunity for claiming and merits-based
resolution of claims), the two roles for procedure are complementary,
even if at times in tension. Indeed, procedure’s role in reducing error
costs230—acknowledged as a necessary role even by those espousing
outcome-based theories of procedure—helps blunt potential normative
arguments that allowing procedure to reduce transaction cost barriers
to the effectuation of claims will gin up litigation and bring claims of
dubious merit into the system.
Along those lines, and as with any procedural role, the role in
reducing transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of recognized
227. As this Article has acknowledged, various strains of procedural theory have long
recognized that any procedural role, however dominant a given theory argues it should be, must
be balanced against competing interests. See, e.g., supra note 156. That said, it is not the task of
this Article to set forth to resolve long-standing debates regarding the theoretical or normative
value and/or scope of the day-in-court ideal by settling questions of which procedural interests—
beyond the ones articulated here—matter and by how much. For particular views on these
debates, see, for example, Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural
Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1880 (2009) (providing a theoretical grounding for the day-in-court
ideal, from which the authors argue the Court should almost never depart); Lawrence Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (arguing that participation rights are the
touchstone of procedural rights). See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979) (discussing the notion of a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue for purposes of
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel).
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 183, at 773–76 (describing the role of procedure as one of
reducing transaction costs and error costs); Kuo-Chang Huang, Does Discovery Promote
Settlement? An Empirical Answer, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 241 (2009).
230. See POSNER, supra note 183. Procedure’s role in reducing error costs is acknowledged
by theorists outside the law and economics realm as well. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 156, at
1018–25 (discussing Dworkin’s outcome-based theory of procedural rights and moral harm,
which nonetheless takes into account error costs). Moreover, at least inasmuch as Pound believed
that the primary purpose of adjudication was to produce outcomes that enforced the substantive
law, he would likely consider it part of procedure’s role to reduce error costs. Like outcome-based
and social justice theorists who would emerge later, Pound’s view that the ultimate goal for
procedure was to bring about merits-based resolution would seemingly be offended by, say, the
extraction of verdict, settlement, or other resolution based on nonmeritorious claims. See, e.g.,
Glover, supra note 2, at Parts I and III.
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rights is necessarily constrained by the relevant substantive rights
themselves. As a historical matter, procedure was inherently
constrained by the subservient role vis-à-vis substantive rights that
Pound ascribed to it; more formally, it is constrained by the
substantive law because of the Rules Enabling Act, the Erie doctrine,
preemption doctrines, and the like. This constraint, however, is also
question-begging vis-à-vis the appropriateness of directing procedure
toward the reduction of transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of
claims: Specifically, and in the absence of any explicit regulation of
litigant autonomy within a particular substantive law, is there
anything about substantive rights qua substantive rights that limits,
or even precludes, this theory of the role of procedure?
At a broad level, this question highlights the substantive law
flipside of Pound’s procedural coin. For Pound, procedure was meant
to integrate with substantive law,231 and the ultimate social justice
goals Pound associated with the outcomes of adjudication were
inextricably linked with the procedures for administering substantive
rights.232 Yet, as commentators have noted, Pound’s theories of social
justice were decidedly thin,233and thus his prescriptions run the risk
that procedure would facilitate the enforcement of normatively
undesirable legal rules and therefore facilitate social injustice.
Since Pound’s time, far more robust accounts of social justice,
the nature of law and moral harm, and substance-divorced roles of
procedure have emerged.234 And in no way do I diminish their
importance or relevance to any ultimate theory of procedure and
procedural justice. It is important to note, though, that many of these
concerns relate more directly to the ex post effects of any adjudicative
judgment upon primary human behavior—ex post effects that, to be
231. See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 523 n.37 (citing various of Pound’s works, including
Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1905) (using the history of law and
equity to argue against legal formalism vis-à-vis substance and procedure)).
232. Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 4, at 406 (criticizing the formalist
procedural and litigation system, the “sporting theory of justice,” of the early 1900s as follows:
“The inquiry [in the cases] is not, What do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the
inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?”).
233. See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 530.
234. Since Pound’s time, theories for justifying law—such as natural law, legal positivism,
and morality theories—have been developed and enriched. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (law and morality); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1980) (natural law); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (legal positivism); JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (theory of justice in a pluralistic society). For discussion of some of
procedure’s additional, substance-divorced functions, see, for example, John R. Allison, Ideology,
Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657 (1994); Robert G. Bone, The Process
of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO.
L.J. 887 (1999).
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sure, constituted one of Pound’s key, but under-theorized, goals for
trans-substantive procedure. An account of procedure as properly
directed toward the reduction of transaction costs to the effectuation of
recognized rights, however, involves an interaction between substance
and procedure that is more bound up with ex ante opportunities—
opportunities for participation in a lawsuit, and opportunities for
presenting one’s claims to a court in the first place.
Though obviously related to any ultimate effects of
adjudication, the interconnectedness between the “handmaid” role of
procedure ex ante and substantive law therefore relates less directly
to outcome-based metrics of social justice and more directly to the
functional nature of substantive rights. Private rights of action—
whatever their ultimate normative valence—are neither self-starting
nor self-executing. And courts (as well as other forms of dispute
resolution, for that matter) are accessible only through assertion,
through procedural means, of a right to remedy under substantive
law. If cases should be resolved on their merits (or at least not on their
transaction costs), reduction of the financial impediments of court
access or lawsuit maintenance seems foundational to procedure’s
“handmaid” role ex ante.235
Indeed, the ex post goals reflected in the text of the Federal
Rules themselves—again, whatever their normative valence—are
derivative of and dependent upon this related, but conceptually
distinct, ex ante role for procedure in reducing transaction cost
barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights. For instance, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that procedure should facilitate the
“determin[ation]” of claims; achievement of that goal would
necessarily require procedural mechanisms for the bringing of
claims—and indeed, such mechanisms can be found in the Federal
Rules.236 More importantly, in creating these mechanisms—

235. To be sure, Congress can address transaction costs in its statutory remedial schemes,
for instance by including statutory or treble damages provisions to ease the costs of claiming.
This sort of substantive lawmaking is of course consistent with regulating legal claims and
litigant autonomy set forth in this Article. Nonetheless, transaction cost barriers to claiming
have persisted even in the face of such statutory provisions. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (involving nonmarketable claims arising under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, which provides for treble damages); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (construing narrowly the terms “prevailing
party,” contained in numerous federal statutes providing fee awards to “prevailing part[ies],” as
not applicable unless the legal relationship between the parties had been altered by final
judgment or, say, a consent decree).
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 7 (defining pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 8
(governing the sufficiency of pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (providing various opportunities for a
party to defend against claims brought against her).
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particularly those related to pleading—Pound and the reformers were
guided by a view that procedural technicalities should not erect
barriers to claiming: procedure should not discourage ordinary people
from bringing claims to court;237 rather procedure should secure
litigants the opportunity to present their cases. Indeed, if procedure
has no role in securing some modicum of opportunity for litigants (and
perhaps “ordinary” litigants in particular) to present their cases,
procedure’s interrelationship with substantive law ex ante does not
amount to all that much; its interrelationship ex post amounts to even
less.
As it turns out, though, these assertions about the weakness of
the relationship between procedure and substance, whether ex ante or
ex post, are less predictive than they are descriptive. Commentators
have noted that, over the years, procedure has been reduced to
somewhat of a second-class status; rather than being interrelated with
substance, procedure has been shunted to the side.238 Indeed, an
anemic or formally nonexistent interrelationship between substance
and procedure is precisely the sort of relationship the Supreme Court
has described in recent cases. A prominent example comes from the
majority opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
authored by the late Justice Scalia. There, the Supreme Court
described substantive rights as “merely formal,”239 thereby accepting
the descriptive reality that substantive rights are not self-executing as
normatively tolerable or even desirable.240 The Court’s description of
substantive rights as “merely formal,” though perhaps the most
blatant in language, is nonetheless an unsurprising outgrowth of the
Court’s rigidly formalistic (and arguably theoretically unsound241)

237. See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 522–25.
238. Id. at 516.
239. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310; see also Glover, supra note 138, at 3073 (“In
abandoning the idea that arbitration agreements cannot impair parties’ practical ability to bring
federal statutory claims, the Court effectively reduced federal substantive causes of action to
mere formalities.”). Even in Italian Colors, the Supreme Court acknowledged, begrudgingly, that
notions of effective vindication of statutory rights might cover filing and administrative fees in
arbitration—transaction costs—that would make access to the forum impracticable. Italian
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. This equivocation on the point seemed to reflect, at best, a
grudging acceptance of its prior dictum to that effect in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000), but possibly a willingness to retreat from that dictum in the future.
Glover, supra note 138, at 3073.
240. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (stating that the existence of a substantive right does
not carry with it a procedural path to vindication).
241. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 218 (arguing that formalism is unsound policy);
Glover, supra note 155.

2017]

A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS

281

views of “procedure” and “substance” that have long existed in its Erie
and Hanna jurisprudence.242
Under a “merely formal” conception of substantive rights, it
would not necessarily be impermissible for procedural law to reduce
transaction costs to claiming.243 However, neither the Court’s decisions
in Shady Grove and Italian Colors nor the formalism undergirding
those opinions would consider it either the appropriate role of
procedure or the dictate of substantive rights to reduce those costs.
Indeed, the Court in Italian Colors makes clear that private parties
may engineer the procedural landscape in ways that increase those
costs, at least in arbitration. Pound, I daresay, would shudder at these
thoughts.244
The Court’s “merely formal” conception of substantive rights,
however, is not just problematic for Pound. Without an opportunity for
vindication, substantive rights amount to little or nothing as a matter
of property theory (worth nothing) and as a matter of certain longstanding strains of rights theory (actually nothing).245 And this notion
that one role for procedure is to secure an “opportunity” for the
vindication of these substantive rights, lest they amount to nothing,
also undergirds the Rules Enabling Act itself, which calls for
consideration of the interaction between substantive rights and
relevant procedures.246
The Court’s “merely formal” conception of substantive rights is
also in tension with Congress’s long-standing, frequent reliance upon
private litigation to achieve regulatory directives.247 Congress and
242. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 414–15
(2010) (advocating for the Sibbach method, which produces “a single hard question of whether a
Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure”); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14
(1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”); see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 218, at
25–26 (describing the Court’s Erie jurisprudence as “wooden”).
243. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1277 (2014) (explicitly invoking such considerations in Judge Posner’s certification and issue
classing decisions).
244. Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 515, 520 (noting that Pound believed that judges, not
parties, should exercise control over procedure; noting also that Pound spoke out vigorously
against legal formalism).
245. This notion derives in part from John Locke’s insight that “ubi jus ibi remedium”
(rights without remedies) are empty rights. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT § 20, at 12 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1690).
246. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 218, at 27–31 (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act,
among other things, calls for consideration of the interaction between the substantive right at
issue and the relevant procedure).
247. Cf. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2010) (explaining how “Congress’s difficulty in controlling
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legislatures know well that substantive rights are not self-executing:
when they wish to calibrate (or recalibrate) the reach of rules
governing primary conduct, they frequently adjust the procedures that
enable, or disable, the effectuation of those rights. Other times, but
operating under a similarly less formalistic conception of substantive
rights, legislatures recalibrate the contours of the substantive right in
ways that either facilitate or frustrate the ability of claimants to
access transaction cost reducing procedures.248
Finally, the “merely formal” descriptor that the Court assigns
to substantive rights misrepresents the actual contours of the very
jurisprudence that generated it. Further, that descriptor obscures the
very real ways in which some of the holdings in the Supreme Court’s
facially formalistic, procedural jurisprudence are driven in large part
by substantive judgments—and more to the point, judgments about
the interaction between the underlying substantive law and relevant
procedural mechanisms.249 In fact, many of the Court’s recent class
action “procedural” holdings have been driven in large part by the
extent to which the Court is comfortable (or not) with that interaction
of procedure and substance as a matter of facilitating or frustrating
claiming.250 In short, the Court’s conceptual formalism is somewhat
fictive.251 Behind the formalist veil, even the current Court recognizes
and accounts for a close interrelationship between procedure and the
effectuation of substantive rights. Whatever the view of particular
justices regarding the proper contours of that interrelationship, it
seems that it cannot credibly be a view that substantive rights are
“merely formal.”
***
The notion that procedure may appropriately be directed toward
the reduction of transaction cost barriers to the effectuation (or
the administrative state can cause . . . reliance upon private lawsuits, which provide a
mechanism for Congress to bypass unwilling agencies and opposing presidents”).
248. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring
heightened pleading for securities fraud in order to make claiming harder, but accepting the use
of the fraud-on-the-market theory for securities fraud claims, which makes claiming as a class
action easier); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (Consol. 2016) (prohibiting the use of class actions for
claims for statutory penalties).
249. Glover, supra note 155.
250. Id.
251. Id. Ironically, the facially, but somewhat fictively, formalist analysis potentially
exacerbates the transaction costs and error costs generated by uncertainty in the substantive
law. See POSNER, supra note 183.
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opportunity to effectuate) of substantive rights is not merely a
theoretical one. That notion also provides a means for operationalizing
this Article’s overall regulatory theory of legal claims, which I
undertake in the following Section. By doing so, the next Section
demonstrates ways in which this Article’s regulatory theory of legal
claims generates new and more coherent procedural paths for our
litigation system—paths the formalist conceptual views struggle to
identify.
B. The Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims Applied
Moving from formalistic conceptual theories to a regulatory
theory of legal claims must not only be justified as a theoretical
matter; it must be justified as a functional matter. This Section
therefore revisits the difficult litigation problems presented in Part II,
as well as the conceptual debate regarding class claims from Part I,
through the lens of this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims.
This analysis generates new insights on these problems, as well as
different, and more normatively coherent, potential regulatory
prescriptions regarding litigant autonomy than those generated by
dichotomous conceptual theories. Those insights, and the potential
procedural prescriptions they generate, commend the theoretical shift
urged by this Article.
1. Applying the Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims
to Rule 68 Offers of Settlement to Named Plaintiffs
Recall from Part II the basic problem at the intersection of
Rule 68 offers of settlement and class actions. Before a class is
certified, the defendant offers to settle with the named plaintiff. On
the one hand, exchange of the named plaintiff’s claim with the
defendant pre-certification appears a straightforward example of
smooth functioning in the market for legal claims. On the other hand,
the gambit by the defendant, presumably, is to eliminate or devalue
all the absent class members’ claims by leaving them without a named
plaintiff.
If the defendant succeeds, assuming the Rule 68 settlement
offer is not of sufficient value to cause the defendant to change or
internalize the costs of its behavior, the “smooth” exchange between
the named plaintiff and defendant would not just frustrate deterrence.
It would destroy the value of the remaining class members’ claims,
and in a particular way: absent the class mechanism, many (or
perhaps all) remaining plaintiffs would now face the significant
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increase in transaction costs associated with pursuing claims
individually. These transaction costs—generated by the named
plaintiff’s exchange of her claim—represent the particular form of
litigation market failure that may be addressed under this Article’s
theory.
Here, there is additional justification for potential regulation.
Although the class is not yet certified, the named plaintiff is in an
advantageous position vis-à-vis settlement negotiations because of her
relationship to and membership in the class. Specifically, given the
defendant’s strategic gambit, the plaintiff is likely able to leverage the
power of the class to obtain a more favorable settlement than she
otherwise could on her own.252 She extracts more value for her
property than she could otherwise by exploiting the value of absent
class members’ property253—the defendant’s willingness to settle with
the named plaintiff presumably stems in significant part from its hope
that settlement with the named plaintiff will functionally resolve the
entire class action—a hope worth considerable value if realized. Thus,
the named plaintiff receives a windfall by leveraging the considerable
value to the defendant of the transaction-cost market failure
generated by the alienation of her claim.
Those espousing a collectivist view of legal claims might well
point to this particular normatively undesirable state of affairs both as
evidence of its theoretical soundness and as support for maintaining
the formalist status quo. Indeed, this scenario reinforces the notion,
embedded in many collectivist views, that claims of related conduct
against the same defendants are inextricably intertwined, their
fortunes tied, and, therefore, their property interests collective as
opposed to individual. Those notions, in turn, would guide procedural
law toward a remedy whereby named plaintiffs’ rights to alienate
claims are restricted or deemed nonexistent. Either way, the
collectivist view remedies the market failure; there is no need for a
different approach to legal claims. There are a number of difficulties
with this.
It is unclear whether the formalist collectivist theory of class
claims has much, if anything, to say about the functional relationship
between the named plaintiff’s claim value and the claim value of other
putative class members. Formal collectivist conceptions lose their
functional force when no class has been certified, and thus no entity

252. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing
the power of aggregate stakes at the bargaining table); Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 427 (same).
253. See supra Part III.A (property law disfavors third-party exploitation of others’ property
interests for their own benefit).
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has emerged. In order to dictate remedies in this scenario, then,
collectivist theories of legal claims would have to recognize the
existence of informal entities or collective units—joined, perhaps, by
collective welfare,254 public purpose,255 or shared interest that might
be frustrated or destroyed by collective action problems and the like,256
just to name a few. As a matter of theory, the collectivist view would
likely support this recognition, if it does not already. Then the real
problems emerge.
Consider the world that a formalist collective view of legal
claims, untethered to formalist notions of litigation entities, would
create. Begin with the pre-certification Rule 68 settlement offer
scenario presented here. Many groups with similar injuries caused by
the same defendants do not become part of a certified class, for any
number of reasons.257 Moreover, settlements often inform other
settlements of similar claims.258 Thus, would an individual in such a
group who, say, needed compensation quickly be prohibited from
settling if it could be argued that her settlement would establish a low
ceiling for future settlements involving similar injuries by the same
defendant? Could any member of a group who suffered similar
injuries, even by different defendants, be similarly restricted, either
on the grounds that the group’s claims are inextricably intertwined or,
more broadly, that the public interest in punishing and preventing
wrongdoing requires such a prohibition? If grounded in the stringent
dictates of formalist conceptions of legal claims, justification for
interference with litigant autonomy is potentially without limit.
Further, and at least to the extent such interference is grounded in a
“public interest” unrelated to the integrity or functioning of the courts,
it arguably constitutes an illegitimate exercise of judicial power.
This Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims would suggest
different and, in the main, more constrained prescriptive responses.
For one, instead of an outright ban on the named plaintiff’s right to
alienate her claim under a Rule 68 settlement, regulation could be
directed toward the party most directly responsible for imposing—
254. See Rosenberg, supra note 9 (arguing for a collective conception of class claims).
255. See generally CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 162 (describing the features of a public
good).
256. See id. at 324–26 (describing the concept of collective action and the concept’s
associated issues).
257. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp 2d 740 (E.D. La. 2011); In re
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47253 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 7, 2016).
258. See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 975 (2010) (“[P]rior settlements are a benchmark or
reference point from which to consider the merits of future, similar cases.”).
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indeed the party whose explicit aim it is to impose—the problematic
transaction costs on remaining plaintiffs. Under that approach,
embodied perhaps in an amendment to Rule 68 or Rule 23, the
defendant would be required, after making a settlement offer to the
named plaintiff, to find a suitable substitute named plaintiff, and, if
none can be found, to retract the offer. This change would likely
reduce the number of Rule 68 settlement offers made to named
plaintiffs—a good result vis-à-vis the market failure of transaction
cost barriers to the effectuation of absent class members’ substantive
rights. Moreover, this change does little, at least formally, to interfere
with the named plaintiff’s right of alienation; it still permits the
named plaintiff to settle, just likely not at the supra-compensatory
rate available prior to rule change. This latter result is not troubling;
indeed it is desirable: the supra-competitive settlement amount
available to the named plaintiff only exists because the current
regulatory structure permits that plaintiff to exploit the transaction
costs against absent class members’ claims to her own advantage. The
regulatory notion is to remove incentives for either defendants or
named plaintiffs to impose these costs, all the while preserving the
named plaintiff’s freedom to exchange her claim.
However, this particular regulatory prescription is ultimately
suboptimal under this Article’s regulatory theory. Fundamentally,
defendants are not loyal to the class; they are certainly not fiduciaries
of the class.259 Indeed, defendants would likely be incentivized to
select affirmatively suboptimal named plaintiffs, thus potentially
leaving in place transaction cost barriers to effective realization of
class claims.260
Named plaintiffs, however, could be described as having some
modicum of fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with, and duties
to, the pre-certified class.261 As such, the autonomy of the named
plaintiff to alienate her claim is arguably appropriately subject to
regulation, at least when exercising that right would (or very likely
would) generate transaction costs to the plaintiff class’s effectuation of
their legal claims. Another potential, and narrowly tailored, form of
procedural regulation, therefore, would be a requirement that the
259. Even the class attorney may not be sufficiently loyal to the class pre-certification. FED.
R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes to 2003 amendment (suggesting the need for interim
counsel with fiduciary duties to the class pre-certification).
260. Such barriers could take the form of additional litigation expenditures needed to obtain
compensation for the plaintiff class that would roughly equal what could have been obtained
with the original, more suitable, named plaintiff with fewer expenditures.
261. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also supra Part III.A (discussing the quasi-fiduciary duties of
third parties in certain relationships with property owners).
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named plaintiff, as a precondition to accepting a Rule 68 offer, remain
in the class until class counsel, exercising good faith efforts, identifies
a suitable replacement. This regulatory response—which could be
embodied in an amendment to either Rule 68 or Rule 23, or even as an
interpretation of a named plaintiff’s duties as set forth by the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 23—would likely work well in the sorts of
class actions typified by a relatively deep bench of suitable and willing
named plaintiffs, as both the transaction costs for replacement would
be low, and the interference on the named plaintiff’s right of
alienation, in terms of time, would also likely be minimal.
However, this response may be insufficient to address the
transaction cost market failure in some instances: First, in cases
where it is apparent that there is no plentiful supply of suitable
replacement named plaintiffs. Or, second, even in cases like the ones
described above, but wherein the transaction costs associated with
identifying a new named plaintiff (and, if defendants continue the
pick-off gambit, another named plaintiff, and so on down the line)
mount in ways that significantly impede the ability of classes to
proceed with their claims. In such instances, prohibiting settlements
with the named plaintiff may be warranted. A narrowly tailored
approach would counsel in favor of a case-by-case restriction of the
named plaintiff’s right to alienate her claim—though any debate by
the Rules Advisory Committee would need to question whether the
transaction costs associated with a case-by-case approach (as the issue
would likely require briefing) would dwarf the transaction costs it
would reduce, therefore suggesting the possible need for a
straightforward ban.
This last regulatory proposal—a ban on named plaintiff
settlements—sounds much like the one required by the collective
approach to legal claims. While it is not the endeavor of this Article to
settle upon any particular regulatory prescription, if application of the
regulatory theory of legal claims leads to a conclusion that named
plaintiffs cannot accept Rule 68 offers of settlement, is the theory
really any different, much less better, than the formalist collectivist
conceptual view?
I believe the answer is yes. First of all, the regulatory theory of
legal claims imposes upon any procedural regulation a number of
limiting principles, which are largely absent in the prescriptive
dictates of formalist conceptual views. Indeed, even though one of the
prescriptions set forth here is the same as that generated by a
collectivist view of claims, its theoretical underpinnings—and
therefore its ultimate reach—are completely different. Specifically,
because any restriction upon the right to alienate one’s legal claims is
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grounded in a theory of procedure as reducing transaction-cost market
failures (generated here by the pick-off settlement), that restriction
necessarily will not be justified across the litigation landscape simply
because various parties’ claims are “inter-connected” or “bound up
with the public interest.” In contrast, both the justification for
regulation of litigant autonomy and the particular design of any
regulatory mechanism in a particular context would stem from the
foundations—and limitations—of this Article’s theory.
For example, this Article’s theory explicitly calls for
consideration of the specifics of the relevant procedural context—here,
Rule 68 pick-off settlements—to determine whether and to what
extent regulation is justified. And in the Rule 68 pick-off context,
justification for some level of restriction of a party’s right to alienate a
claim is rather strong, at least as a matter of sensitivity to transaction
cost barriers to claiming. Drawing specifically from the property
theory foundations of this Article’s theory, justification for regulation
in this context is bolstered by the fact that the named plaintiff is in
somewhat of a functional fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with
other class members and their property interests.262
Justification for regulation under this Article’s theory,
however, does not come without limitation. Generally speaking, then,
the foundations of this Article’s theory would tend to steer such
regulation toward mechanisms that interfere as little as possible with
the right of alienation. To operationalize these broader principles,
consider as an example the following possible regulatory mechanism.
Instead of simply prohibiting named plaintiffs from accepting Rule 68
settlement offers (the prescription that flows necessarily from the
collectivist view of legal claims), the designation of named plaintiff
status could be conditioned upon the refusal of any such settlement
offer as part of a named plaintiff’s duties to the class pre-certification.
This regulatory mechanism certainly (though justifiably) interferes
with the named plaintiff’s right to alienate her claim, but it does so
more narrowly, and perhaps more tolerably as a matter of property
law and theory, through a form of consent.
2. Applying the Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims
to Alternative Litigation Finance
By its own terms, alternative litigation funding facilitates the
effectuation of substantive claims by reducing transaction costs
associated with litigation. Prohibitions on the alienation of legal
262. See supra Part III.A.
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claims, currently in the form of maintenance and champerty laws, but
potentially in the form of any number of proposed regulations on
litigation finance,263 prevent the use of funding arrangements to
reduce those costs. To the extent the effect of litigation funding on
reducing transaction costs to claiming is descriptively accurate,264
prohibitions on those subsidies of litigation are inconsistent with this
Article’s theory of legal claims and the role of procedure to reduce the
transaction costs of claiming.
Here, those committed to a strong individual autonomy view of
legal claims would offer their conceptual view as a remedy:
maintenance and champerty laws are inconsistent with
individualistic, absolutist views of property rights, and thus should be
jettisoned. Perhaps (though not certainly) because of the dominance of
this individualistic conception of legal claims in the procedural
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, this prescription is already
becoming reality.265 However, the individualistic conceptual approach
has difficulties. First, it is limited in its ability to provide guidance for
procedural decisionmaking vis-à-vis litigation finance beyond the
point of sale of claims (champerty) or the point of obtaining funding
for pursuing claims (maintenance). Second, even as to the elements of
alternative litigation finance for which it can provide prescriptive
guidance, it paints with too broad a brush.

263. See, e.g., Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV.
388 (2016) (proposing modifications to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to regulate potential
conflicts of interest in litigation financing); Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1155 (2015) (suggesting a paradigm shift in viewing and regulating litigation
funding from a “legal ethics paradigm” to an “incorporation paradigm”); Martin J. Estevao, Note,
The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467
(2013) (discussing measures to “prevent predatory behavior and ensure reasonable profits for
[litigation financing companies]”); Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond, CENTER ON CIVIL
JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/civiljustice/
2015-fall-conference [https://perma.cc/7XV8-PG2A] (Panels Two (Professors Geoffrey Miller,
Maya Steinitz, Bradley Wendel, Michael G. Faure, and Jef De Mot; Joshua Schwadron and
Travis Lenkner) and Four (Professors Arthur Miller, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, J. Maria
Glover, Victoria Shannon Sahani, and Stephen Gillers; Michael Fishbein), discussing possible
regulations of litigation finance).
264. Some have expressed concern that the funding terms leave plaintiff with little
compensation. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1277, 1322. To the extent litigation funding
effectuated claiming but did not confer compensatory benefit to the plaintiff, this Article’s
conception of procedure’s role vis-à-vis transaction costs would perhaps not be offended in the
abstract. That conception, however, is tied to fundamental precepts of property, which would
frown upon the funders’ complete devaluation of plaintiffs’ claim; it is also tied to a market of
claims that are pursued for compensation. See supra Part III.A.
265. See, e.g., Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The
consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding, champerty’s reach.”).
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As to the first difficulty, the individualistic conception of legal
claims, grounded as it is in near-absolutist views of property rights,
would likely prescribe the elimination of maintenance and champerty
laws or any other such prohibitions. That is likely the end of its
regulatory journey. However, those laws prohibiting litigation finance
are only the beginning of the overall regulatory road. The aim of
maintenance and champerty laws is to restrict directly the ability of
third-party litigation funding to reduce transaction cost barriers to
effectuation of substantive claims. Other existing procedural rules and
doctrines, however, make no mention of financing at all. Yet, they are
being used indirectly to impose additional transaction costs on
subsidized plaintiffs.
For instance, defendants frequently seek discovery of
communications involved in obtaining litigation financing—the deal
documents themselves—and communications with the funder that
occurred after that deal was signed.266 Apart from the relatively rare
situation in which the defendant has a legitimate defense under state
law champerty or maintenance doctrines,267 the only relevance of
these documents is that they reflect either the litigation funder’s or
the party’s assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims
and the damages estimate.268 This satisfies relevance in a technical
sense, but it is not the sort of information that should be used at
trial.269 At bottom, these are less discovery requests than they are
mechanisms to impose significant transaction costs upon plaintiffs
who need litigation funding—perhaps significant enough to impede
efforts by plaintiffs to use litigation funding at all.
The few courts that have addressed these issues have by and
large extended work product protection to such communications.270
However, the requirements in the discovery rules for claiming
privilege271—which require plaintiffs to create a privilege log—enable

266. See Glover, supra note 126 (citing all cases with published opinions on the issue).
267. See Del Webb Cmtys., 652 F.3d at 1156 (“The consistent trend across the country is
toward limiting, not expanding, champerty’s reach.”).
268. Glover, supra note 126.
269. For instance, a funder’s assessment of the plaintiff’s likely recovery should not be used
to influence the fact finder’s resolution of the claim’s merits, any more than an adversary should
be able to call its adversary’s attorneys to testify about the legal weakness of their client’s case.
See, e.g., Mister v. Ne. Ill. Commuter R.R. Corp., 571 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that party
admission can be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403); Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (stating the trier of fact should not be invited to
treat candid internal assessments of the strength of the party’s legal position as evidence of
guilt).
270. Glover, supra note 126.
271. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
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the requests alone to impose transaction costs upon a funded plaintiff.
Indeed, these costs are unique to funded plaintiffs and additional to
those associated with discovery into the merits. The creation of a
privilege log is well known to be a burdensome task, and in the
context of litigation finance, perhaps particularly so. All told,
obtaining, setting up, and using litigation funding can generate
hundreds, if not thousands, of email communications and
documents.272 If one role of procedure is to reduce transaction cost
barriers to claiming, these discovery requests achieve the opposite:
they impose a penalty.
The individualistic conceptual view of legal claims has little, if
anything, to say about discovery requests, privilege logs, and work
product privilege. Theoretically, perhaps, an individualistic conception
of legal claims might demand reform to the extent these practices
actually eliminated litigation-funding outfits or stopped those outfits
from financing any claims under a certain value, thereby indirectly
restraining alienation. However, even that theoretical possibility is
speculative. These claims would likely be lumped together
conceptually with all the other unmarketable claims, like those in the
Court’s individualistic arbitration jurisprudence. That is to say, wholly
disregarded.
This Article’s regulatory theory, however, would address these
and other indirect restrictions on alienation for purposes of litigation
funding. This regulatory theory may call for amendment to or
particularized interpretation of procedural law to prevent the
imposition of additional, funded-litigation-specific transaction costs.
For instance, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) could be amended
to declare communications with litigation financing entities per se
irrelevant—though this is likely overbroad.273 Alternatively, Rule 26
could be amended to provide near-categorical protection under the
work product doctrine to litigation-funding documents. It could read:
“This Rule does not contemplate that a party claiming
communications with a litigation financing entity has to describe the
nature of the documents or materials withheld pursuant to the work
product privilege.”
This Article’s regulatory theory would also, of course, provide
guidance regarding direct prohibitions on litigation finance—guidance
that would differ in important respects from that provided by the

272. Glover, supra note 126; supra Part III.
273. Imagine a plaintiff, funded by a third-party financer, wished to sue that financer for
breach of contract. Those documents would be directly relevant, as Rule 26(a) currently
prescribes, to a party’s claims or defenses. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
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individualistic conception of claims. Both the individualistic
conception of legal claims and this Article’s theory of legal claims
would call for the elimination of champerty laws, which prohibit the
selling of one’s claim to another. However, there are real concerns
about litigation funding’s normative valence vis-à-vis the integrity and
functioning of litigation and the judicial system in the context of
maintenance—in particular, concerns that funders will support
litigation not to reduce an impecunious party’s transaction costs, but
to coax a would-be plaintiff to bring suit so that the funder may
achieve its own goals and to settle its own scores.274 In addition to
ginning up (arguably) wasteful litigation, such practices obscure the
“real party in interest” from the court.
The near-absolute conception of property rights undergirding
the individualistic view of legal claims would likely not impose
restrictions on a funder’s ability to coax a claimholder to litigation in
this way. And to be sure, this Article’s regulatory theory of legal
claims, limited as it currently and necessarily is to guiding procedure
toward the reduction of transaction costs to claiming, does not speak
directly to this normative concern. In contrast with the individualistic
conceptual theory of legal claims, however, the regulatory theory
leaves room for exploring (1) whether procedure may appropriately
regulate litigant autonomy when it interferes with systemic interests
of the courts, the judicial system, and the judicial function,275 and (2) if
so, whether the benefits and potential effectiveness of such regulation,
motive-based as it may be in the situation of a litigation funder with
ulterior motives,276 outweigh its downsides either to litigant autonomy
or to other interests to which procedural regulation may appropriately
be directed. Again, it is not (and cannot be) the aim of this Article to
provide an answer for all possible questions—including this last one
regarding maintenance. What the foregoing analysis demonstrates,
274. See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of maintenance and champerty laws, as well
as the controversial funding, by Peter Thiel, of Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against Gawker).
275. See, e.g., supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations of courts to issue injunctions
restricting property use grounded in the “public interest,” but noting that interests directly
bearing upon the judicial function and integrity of the courts might appropriately constitute a
“public interest” for which the judiciary can regulate). Further, any such procedural regulation
would have intellectual foundations in the already existing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
which gives judges the authority to sanction parties who bring litigation for improper purposes.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
276. Motive-based regulations are those aimed at people’s motives—here, the motives of the
funder and the claimant. They are difficult to enforce, given their focus on subjective intent, and
they create perverse incentives for individuals to cover their tracks. They are also somewhat
inconsistent with the objective character of property regulations that restrict “improper use,”
which are agnostic to say, the motive of neighbor A in filling his lawn with prohibited ornaments
and statutes; whether he likes that décor or just wants to annoy his neighbor is irrelevant.
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however, is that this Article’s theory can provide guidance on difficult
litigation issues in a way that is more normatively coherent and
transparent than existing formalist theories and frameworks.
3. A Regulatory Approach to Legal Claims in the Context
of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Recall that mandatory arbitration agreements, particularly
(though not necessarily) those with class action waivers, have been
shown to reduce, if not eliminate, the ability for plaintiffs to vindicate
their claims in any forum.277 The Supreme Court’s procedural
arbitration jurisprudence enables and even incentivizes278 these sorts
of contracts. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that, among other
things, the Supreme Court’s procedural jurisprudence is strongly
undergirded by an individualistic conception of legal claims.
Individualistic views of claims, at their core, call for largely
unfettered rights of claim exchange. In property, such free exchange is
commended by the notion that it tends to promote efficient exchange
and thus property is directed toward its highest-value use. In the
context of mandatory arbitration agreements, however, it is far from
clear that claims are being exchanged toward their highest-value use;
indeed, most would-be plaintiffs do not even realize that they are
making the exchange in the first place. Consumers and employees
suffer a distinct informational disadvantage relative to the drafting
corporations with regard to both the meaning of key legal terms in the
agreement279 and with regard to the nature of the exchange of their
legal claims. Regarding the latter, even if consumers are aware that
by accepting a job or obtaining a cell phone they are exchanging their
legal claims ex ante for arbitration, they are not aware that they are
likely exchanging them ex post for no dispute resolution at all, given
the surrender of procedural mechanisms, like the class action, that
would defray the often high transaction costs of bringing their
claims.280 Thus, those future legal claims are exchanged for perhaps

277. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 1, at 9, 11 (finding that of the
tens of millions of consumers who use consumer financial products or services that are subject to
arbitration clauses, only 1,847 individual disputes were filed with the AAA).
278. See Glover, supra note 138, at 3076, 3092 (noting that it would be unwise for corporate
counsel not to include arbitration clauses and class action prohibitions in contracts with
employees, consumers, and the like).
279. See Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903,
1915–16 (2000).
280. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (finding
that without the cost-sharing enabled by class procedures, no single merchant could afford the
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nothing at all: despite claims by corporations that mandatory
arbitration agreements confer value to consumers because the cost
savings associated with arbitration (or, more likely, no arbitration) are
passed on to consumers in the form of lower-cost goods,281 empirical
research does not support this claim.282
Taking the strongest collectivist view of legal claims—that they
are not purely individual property—and the collectivist view of
claimants—that they are not purely individual property holders—
would suggest the need for restrictions upon the rights of consumers
and employees to alienate their claims through these contracts, on the
theory that their future claims are intertwined with those of others
and with public interests.283 Fundamentally, this is of course a nonstarter: at the very least, it is wholly impractical to ban consumers
from purchasing goods or employees from accepting jobs, particularly
when—at least in the consumer context—all sellers of a particular
good use the same basic contract, and it is nonnegotiable. Moreover, it
would be equally impractical to regulate an exchange individuals have
little to no idea they are making 284
transaction costs of an antitrust expert—estimated to be around a million dollars—required to
prove their claims).
281. Empirical research does show that arbitration generates cost savings in comparison to
litigation, but those costs tend to be internalized by the contract drafters. Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336–39 (2007)
(discussing the reasons why arbitration arguably is less costly than litigation); Theodore
Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
871 (2008) (presenting evidence that companies include arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts not because it is less costly but because it precludes aggregate consumer actions).
282. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 10, at 5 (finding that despite the
large amount collected, no empirical evidence supported the claim that mandatory arbitration
contracts produced cost savings for consumers).
283. One of the relevant public interests is that of public precedent and judicial opinions.
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 774,
799–800 (2008) (providing cell phone contract to illustrate that much of what is traditionally
public becomes private in private dispute settlements); Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 148, at
809, 838 (arguing that the open nature of judicial proceedings themselves is a public value lost in
the wave of arbitration). See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 11, at 1085–87
(discussing the public value of written opinions). Another is the loss of public proceedings,
whether or not the cases actually go to trial. Another is the public’s interest in deterring
corporations from wrongdoing—at least to the extent mandatory arbitration agreements with
class action waivers amount to exculpatory clauses for defendants. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note
148, at 378, 430 (arguing that corporate wrongdoing is deterred by class action liability).
284. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW: SELECTED READINGS 59, 61 (Donald A. Wittman ed., 2002) (arguing that
public regulation is better when information related to wrongdoing is “difficult to communicate
to private parties because of its technical nature”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies,
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Assume, however, that the collectivist view did not require
such an extreme response. Presume instead that the collectivist view
of legal claims called for restrictions upon the terms of the contracts
themselves—perhaps on the theory that, given the uniformity of the
contracts and the transactions, the public interests at stake, and the
collective action problems to claiming in these contexts, the future
claims are properly considered as part of a collective. On that theory,
those claims should not be disentangled ex ante. However, as with all
applications of the conceptual approaches to legal claims, even when
selectively deployed, there are difficulties.
Once more, the collective prescription goes too far. As a
preliminary matter, it is difficult to conceptualize future interests as
either primarily individual or primarily collective in this context. Even
if the drafters’ strategic gambit suggests the potential for collective
claims, one might accuse the conceptual framework of jumping the
gun. Be that as it may, public values such as judicial precedent, public
proceedings, and even deterrence are no doubt important—perhaps so
much so in any particular case as to justify regulation of property
rights or freedom of contract—but those values are present in nearly
all cases.285 Absent any other restriction on the dictates of this
conception of legal claims, the formalist collectivist conception—
though still perhaps appealing in the clarity of its content and
prescriptive consequences—is also still troubling in its tendency not to
impose limiting principles.
Nonetheless, perhaps this flaw of formalism would be tolerable
if the negative transaction cost consequences for legal claims in the
context of mandatory arbitration agreements flowed exclusively, or
even primarily, from improper conception of claims. Moreover, an
individualistic conception of claims undoubtedly undergirds the
Court’s adoption of near-absolute principles of freedom-of-contract
conceptions in these cases—principles that in turn justify these
exchanges. That said, the provisions in these contracts that have
generated the most concern among scholars, Congress, courts,
regulatory agencies, and litigants were crafted with near-explicit
recognition of the collective character of a great number of future

91 VA. L. REV. 93, 97 (2005) (arguing that Congress should delegate the responsibility to create
private rights of action to agencies charged with administering the relevant statute because the
agency has superior information about the effects of private suits on overall enforcement
strategy).
285. For instance, Owen Fiss’s view regarding the value of the creation of judicial precedent
and the scourge of settlement would call for no settlement. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note
11; Fiss, The History of an Idea, supra note 11 (defending his views from Against Settlement).
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claims.286 To some degree, then, that collective conception was the
genesis of some of the problematic provisions. Drafters of these
agreements, therefore, relied on two completely opposite conceptions of
legal claims in formulating, providing, and compelling the
enforcement of contractual provisions that impose transaction cost
barriers to the effectuation of substantive claims. Those transaction
costs, therefore, do not flow exclusively from one conception or the
other; the transaction costs, not the conceptual theory, are the gambit.
Indeed, what unifies the problematic contractual provisions in
arbitration agreements is that they impose transaction cost barriers to
claiming. Some provisions eliminate collective procedures. Some
include forum selection clauses requiring travel to far-flung fora or
include fee-shifting provisions that require claimants to incur heavy
expenses just to bring their claim—both stymied to greater and lesser
degrees under unconscionability doctrine.287 Others prohibit
individuals from sharing expert evidence with others similarly
situated in order to reduce the often exorbitant transaction costs
associated with developing an expert report.288
Moreover, contractual provisions aimed at reducing these
transaction costs have proved ineffective—a wholly unsurprising fact
given the overall strategic goals of those drafting the contracts. For
instance, the arbitration clause at issue in AT&T Mobility, LLC v.
Concepcion289 purported to correct the failure by providing that it
would pay any claimant’s arbitration fees, and, among other things,
that it would provide a bonus payment of five thousand dollars to any
claimant whose ultimate arbitral award exceeded any of AT&T’s prior
settlement offers to that claimant.290 As a matter of offsetting
transaction costs, this contractual response by AT&T seemed sound
enough. As a practical matter, it was wholly ineffective: even after the
revision of its arbitration clause, very few claimants brought their
claims in arbitration versus AT&T; even fewer obtained
286. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); David Korn & David
Rosenberg, Concepcion’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel
Solution, 46 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151 (2013) (suggesting that a court certify a class of plaintiffs
subject to mandatory arbitration agreement with class prohibitions before sending them to
arbitration; once in arbitration, the plaintiffs arbitrate individually, but proceed from a collective
posture vis-à-vis pre-trial discovery cost sharing and the like); Nagareda, supra note 37, at 1115.
287. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 148, at 1745–46 (discussing first-generation arbitration
clauses, which contained particularly draconian provisions).
288. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133
S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 705521, at *4 (discussing whether confidentiality
clauses vis-à-vis evidence sharing in arbitration contracts would be enforceable).
289. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
290. Id. at 351–52.
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compensation.291 This is unsurprising for a host of reasons, one of
which AT&T was no doubt well aware: consumers by and large tend
not to read their contracts292 nor do they understand key contractual
terms, even potentially favorable ones.293
To reduce transaction costs to effective vindication of claims in
the context of mandatory arbitration agreements, any regulatory
response must account for the transactional context in which the
claims operate. The most prominent regulatory response in existence
is the
rule recently promulgated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) prohibiting the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements in certain financial products in the financial
industry.294 The CFPB rule’s broad prohibitions on freedom of contract
are grounded in a number of concerns that reach far beyond those
associated with transaction cost barriers to claiming. These concerns
are beyond the scope of this Article’s regulatory framework; some are
likely beyond the scope of this Article’s entire regulatory theory of
legal claims.
Whatever the normative valence of the CFPB rule, it would
have limited reach, if it issues.295 The CFPB has limited jurisdiction,
and the rule would almost assuredly not reach any number of
industries or entities that use mandatory arbitration agreements.
Moreover, the future of the CFPB itself is currently a bit uncertain,
both as a matter of whether it will be allowed to maintain its current
independence from the executive,296 and as a matter of whether
291. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 3, at 51.
292. See, e.g., id. § 3, at 28–29 (noting that very few consumers read arbitration contracts,
and even those who do generally do not understand what arbitration is).
293. See id. § 3, at 23 (finding that seventy-five percent of people do not know what
arbitration is).
294. On May 6, 2016, and pursuant to § 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Public Law 111-203), the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
(Bureau) proposed to establish 12 CFR part 1040, which would (1) prohibit covered providers of
certain consumer financial products and services from using an agreement with a consumer that
provides for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties to bar the consumer from filing
or participating in a class action with respect to the covered consumer financial product or
service; and (2) require a covered provider that is involved in an arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement to submit specified arbitral records to the Bureau; and (3) apply to
certain consumer financial products and services. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Establish 12 CFR Part 1040 (May 6, 2016), http://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CFPB_Arbitration_Agreements_Notice_of_Proposed_Rulemak
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7YE-PLKN].
295. The comment period for this proposed rule closed on August 22, 2016; no rule has
issued as of January 1, 2017.
296. On October 11, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
struck down the structure of the CFPB as violating Article II of the Constitution. See PHH Corp.
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 4–6 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As an independent agency
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Congress makes various changes to the source the CPFB’s creation
and authority, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act—which is one of the many targets of the new
administration.297
The procedural provisions in mandatory arbitration
agreements engineer the litigation landscape in a very particular
way—namely, so as to generate transaction costs to the effectuation of
substantive rights. Of late, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the
FAA—a procedural law, in the non-Rules Enabling Act sense298—as
appropriately directed toward reducing (or at least not intentionally
generating) transaction costs to the effectuation of substantive rights.
A heavily individualistic conception of litigant autonomy undergirds
and enables the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence permitting—perhaps
even endorsing—that engineering of the litigation landscape.299
According to this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, however,
situations in which contractual provisions engineer the litigation
landscape in such a way are precisely those for which judicial
regulation of litigant autonomy is warranted.
The most direct regulatory response that flows from this
Article’s regulatory theory—and one that happens to be more
consistent with both the text of the FAA and the view of procedure
that originally animated the FAA300 rather than current Supreme
Court FAA jurisprudence—would be a judicial one. A broad response,
grounded in the notion that procedure is appropriately directed
toward reducing transaction costs to the effectuation of recognized
rights, would involve a reinterpretation of the FAA as not permitting
the inclusion of contractual procedural provisions that are designed to
generate such costs. A narrower response—one that might better
headed by a single Director, removable only for cause, CFPB’s structural departure from
historical practice “ma[de] a significant difference for the individual liberty protected by the
Constitution’s separation of powers” because the single director possesses more unilateral
authority than the multi-member commission. Id. at 36. The court remedied this violation by
striking down the for-cause removal provision of the Dodd-Frank Act. See id. at 38–39. On
November 18, 2016, CFPB petitioned for a rehearing en banc. See Respondent Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) (No. 15-01177).
297. See, e.g., Ryan Tracy, Donald Trump’s Transition Team: We Will “Dismantle” DoddFrank, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-transition-teamwe-will-dismantle-dodd-frank-1478800611 [https://perma.cc/W9JZ-TP3W].
298. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315–20 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the FAA governs procedure, and therefore should yield in the presence of
federal statutes governing substantive legal rights).
299. See Glover, supra note 155 (arguing that underlying the Court’s recent arbitration
decisions was a substantive judgment about the normative value of low-value class action suits).
300. See Glover, supra note 138, at 3059–64.
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balance litigant autonomy and freedom-of-contract principles and
transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights—
might involve a more as-applied approach, whereby contracts
containing procedural provisions designed to generate transaction
costs would be struck down if and when they prevent or severely
impede the effectuation of recognized substantive rights. Under that
narrower approach, contractual provisions might be allowed on a caseby-case basis (for instance, if they do not actually generate significant
transaction costs to claiming) or for other compelling reasons largely
beyond the scope of this Article’s current framework.301
Either regulatory suggestion, of course, requires a change in
the Court’s current interpretation of the FAA. These approaches also
call for the Court to move away from the formal individualistic views
of litigant autonomy and legal claims that undergird its FAA
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, these judicial regulatory solutions are
perhaps the cleanest of all: from procedural doctrine the problem
came; from procedural doctrine the problem should depart. Order
could be restored to the galaxy.
4. Coming Full Circle: A Regulatory Approach to Legal Claims
in the Contexts of Class Action Opt-Outs and Class Unity
This Article began by tracing the contours of a long-standing
conceptual debate in the class action context about whether the class
device is best viewed as a collection of individuals, who should retain

301. For instance, one way in which an arbitration agreement might seek to prevent
claimants from effectuating substantive claims is to prohibit any cost-sharing procedures. Italian
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the arbitration agreement in
Italian Colors prohibited class actions as well as any form of cost-sharing among individuals in
arbitration). Whether it is appropriate to strike down such prohibitions on the grounds that
procedure’s role is to reduce (or at least not generate) transaction costs to claiming would depend
upon the precise cost-sharing mechanism being banned. For instance, both established contract
principles and litigation practice allow for the confidential exchange of evidence in a lawsuit and
for the confidentiality of settlement. These practices, though not without their critics, are
believed, among other things, to protect sensitive information, increase accuracy, promote
settlement, and perhaps most relevant for this Article, reduce transaction costs to settlement.
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended
Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1480–82 (2006) (disallowing secret settlements increases
health and other hazards to the public because parties will opt to leave the system of litigation
altogether, removing the claims from the public eye); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein,
Class Action Lawyers As Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004) (noting confidentiality practices
“promote settlement of the current case, increase the accuracy of the litigation process, and
reduce legal error”); Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential
Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 438–40 (2005)
(discussing pro-confidentiality scholars’ emphasis on cost saving and litigants’ rights to privacy
and autonomy). This Article leaves such granular regulatory questions to later work.
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near-full autonomy over their claims, or as an entity, wherein
individuals tie their fortunes to one another, perhaps even so much as
to prevent them from opting out of the class. Recall that the Court has
moved in a decidedly individualistic conceptual direction in its class
action jurisprudence, and particularly in its interpretation of class
certification requirements. That individualistic view calls for class
members to retain a great deal of autonomy over claims, and thus
leads courts to scrutinize proposed classes under Rule 23 for near-total
similarity among claimants at the certification stage302 and to
approach with great skepticism any class that does not provide for optouts.303
To be sure, many of the opinions rooted in notions of individual
autonomy of legal claims provide important protections for class
members.304 At the same time, jurisprudence rooted in individual
autonomy has eliminated settlement deals and left plaintiffs without
compensation;305 it has also provided defendants with a great deal of
ammunition for preventing the certification of classes—and thereby
preventing the economies of scale for claiming achievable under the

302. For an argument that this requirement misses the mark, see Bone, supra note 34, at
651 (“[A] cohesiveness requirement . . . sends courts on a hopeless, misguided search for class
unity.”).
303. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363, 366 (2011) (denying 12(b)(2)
mandatory class claims for back pay, despite incidentally flowing from Title VII claims for
injunctive relief, while noting that mandatory classes, “rightly or wrongly,” still exist (emphasis
added)).
304. Indeed, collectivist views of class members’ legal claims—views that often lead to a
demand that Rule 23 disallow any opt-outs—are particularly concerning. Moreover, one can
identify the problems of these views in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions that also include claims for
monetary relief. See, e.g., id. at 359 (unanimously rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to certify claims
for backpay under Rule 23(b)(2)). In order to obtain (b)(2) certification, plaintiffs are incentivized
to downplay the compensatory elements of class members’ claims; for instance, in Dukes, the
compensatory element was limited to backpay. Id. at 345. The problem, however, stems from the
preclusive effects that would attach to any future class members’ claims for other forms of
compensatory relief to which she may have been legally entitled, but which were not brought in
the original class action. Id. at 364. Intra-class conflicts can also arise when the class for
(monetarily valuable) injunctive and monetary is comprised of members competing for a limited
pool of resources. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827
F.3d 223, 236 (2d Cir. 2016) (rejecting seven billion dollar settlement proposal for a class of
merchants certified under both 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on the grounds that class counsel could not
represent both classes, who were competing for a limited pool of relief from defendants).
305. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Recent Developments in Nationwide Products Liability
Litigation: The Phenomenon of Non-Injury Products Cases, the Impact of Amchem and the Trend
Toward State Court Adjudication, and the Continued Viability of Carefully Constructed
Nationwide Classes in the Federal Courts, SC33 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1, 23
(1998).
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class mechanism—under the auspices of “protecting” the various class
members’ autonomy.306
As with the procedural scenarios discussed above, the problem
is not so much that either conceptual view is unable to achieve a
“good” result at any given time. It is that procedural regulation, tied to
formalist conception, tends to generate normatively and theoretically
inconsistent results.307 Again, though, if the regulatory theory of legal
claims suggested by this Article is to have persuasive force, it must
generate different and better answers for procedural law and for the
regulation of litigant autonomy. This Article therefore concludes by
examining the operation of the regulatory theory of legal claims
within the context of the hotbed of conceptual debate—class action
certification.
Of course, there is far more involved in debates about
certification requirements and opt-outs than could be covered, much
less given justice, here. Therefore, I limit the analysis here to one
particularly thorny issue regarding litigant autonomy in the classcertification universe—the problem of negative-value class claims at
the certification stage.
Under the regulatory theory of legal claims set forth in this
Article, there is arguably little justification for limiting litigant
autonomy in situations where, in the main, class members’ claims are
individually marketable, unless perhaps there is some anomalous
condition vis-à-vis the resources of the relevant group of plaintiffs.308
In class actions made up of individually marketable claims,
vindication of substantive rights is not particularly dependent upon
the transaction-cost-lowering effects of class procedure. Indeed, the
resulting exchange of those claims—via settlement—may well be
worse for claimholders as a matter of compensation and access to
justice through the class proceeding than had they struck out on their

306. See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 362–63 (noting that there needs to be a case specific
inquiry into whether class issues predominate with respect to each member’s individual claims,
whereas there are fewer protections when in a 23(b)(2) class because the relief is collective in
nature); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Campos, supra note 9, at
1066.
307. See supra Part I.B and Part II.
308. For instance, if the group of plaintiffs is a sophisticated group of wealthy investors
claiming securities fraud, the combination of their resources and high-value claims may well
counsel in favor of a thumb on the scale for litigant autonomy. Alternatively, if the group of
plaintiffs is a group of industrial workers who have inhaled asbestos, their claims might be of
high value, but their resources virtually nonexistent. There, the value of claims cannot be the
only touchstone for determining the public nature of the claims. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at
625–26.
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own.309 Of course, this is not to say that there aren’t any number of
systemic reasons—efficiency, as well as access to justice for claimants
unrelated to the class in the judicial queue—that justify the joinder of
multifarious similar claims (though such interests may not justify
restricting litigant autonomy).
In this relative absence of transaction costs to claiming, the
appropriate regulatory response is likely none at all—to preserve
existing judicial doctrine vis-à-vis Rule 23’s certification requirements
and opt-out provisions. This is by no means an endorsement of the
individualistic conception of claims that underlies the doctrine to be
preserved. In this particular context, Rule 23 doctrine happens to
align well with the notion that procedure should reduce transaction
costs to effective vindication of recognized rights. The problem, then, is
the basis for this happenstantially appropriate doctrine. Because it
rests on a conceptual theory, it risks functioning a bit like a broken
clock—right twice a day (and for the wrong reason).
When scrutinizing a class at the certification stage, courts are
in part worried that class members’ claims will be undersold either
because of a lack of unity among the class (unity defined, perhaps
ironically, as identity of individual interests)310 or because of the

309. Perhaps the most egregious illustration of this possibility comes from nonpecuniary
class action coupon settlements, which constitute inefficient outcomes and provide inadequate
compensation for individual plaintiffs. See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS 27, 83, 488–89 (2000) (noting coupon settlements are “inadequate compensation for
the alleged wrongdoing of defendants” and, because they “impose no real cost on the defendant,”
do not achieve deterrence); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon
Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 994–95
(2002) (noting coupon settlements are structured to “maximize the gains for the corporate
defendant while minimizing any compensation to the class,” and that class counsel often “sell out
the interests of the class in exchange for relatively generous attorneys’ fees”); Geoffrey P. Miller
& Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 110
(1997) (recognizing nonpecuniary settlements create inefficiency, difficulty in valuation of
damages, and opportunity for attorney manipulation where “counsel . . . accept[s] settlement less
favorable to class than what counsel might obtain by further prosecution”). The Court has
expressed similar concerns in its due process analysis regarding monetary claims embedded in
mandatory classes for non-monetary relief. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 362–63 (“While we have never
held [an absence of the right to opt-out violated due process] where the monetary claims do not
predominate, the serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read
Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here”; noting also that the allowance of nonpredominant monetary damages in a mandatory class did not stem from Rule 23); Ortiz, 527 U.S.
at 846–47 (“[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the due process
principle” where “damages claims [are] gathered in a mandatory class” and “objectors to the
collectivism of a mandatory subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no inherent right to abstain.”).
310. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 34 at 654–55 (discussing the Court’s focus on similarity and
unity among class members).
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mandatory nature of the proposed class, if relevant.311 The economic
transaction—the settlement—whereby claims are traded for a fair
value for some, may well impose a negative externality upon both the
remaining class members, who are undersold, and upon the public,
which does not receive the value of deterrence tied to the scope of the
wrongdoing.312 However, whether the first concern (and relatedly the
second) actually manifests depends in large part on the value of any
individual’s claim in the first place and the resources available,
generally speaking, to the plaintiffs involved. In other words, whether
there is a negative effect upon various absent class members’
effectuation of substantive claims depends upon whether they could
pursue their claims individually in the first place; if they could not do
so, the negative effect of a settlement upon their ability to claim, their
access to justice, or their ability to obtain compensation is somewhat
fictive. Accordingly, stringent certification requirements driven by
individualistic conceptions of legal claims seem out of place, as Justice
Breyer suggested in Amchem.313
More than that, stringent certification requirements that
demand high levels of “class unity”314 may well frustrate the ability to
311. See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 364 (noting protections of 23(b)(3) class counters the
incentive to risk a class’s “potentially valid claims for monetary relief”); see also Ortiz, 527 U.S.
at 849 (noting the certification of mandatory 23(b)(2) class actions effectively concludes all
proceedings, save the final fairness hearing, ending the claims of all absent persons the rule is
designed to protect); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827
F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that (b)(2) certification was inappropriate because, among
other things, it risked underselling plaintiffs’ monetary claims).
312. See Glover, supra note 2, at 1185 (discussing the need for connection between scope of
the wrong and scope of the compensation as it relates to deterrence).
313. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
314. In class action jurisprudence, class unity is not defined, as one might think, by the
presence of interdependence among claimants vis-à-vis normative goals, but rather—perhaps
ironically—by identity of claims and claimant characteristics among individuals. See, e.g., Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). The question animating the doctrinal
search for class unity, therefore, is an individualistic one: are the individual claims and
claimants sufficiently similar that, in one individual’s self-interested pursuit of her litigation
interests, she will necessarily advance the litigation interests of the other class members?
Underlying the concept of litigation interests, in turn, is necessarily an individualistic conception
of that term: for a plaintiff with an individually unmarketable claim, the named plaintiff’s
pursuit of her claim—even if it differs somewhat from the unmarketable claim—arguably
advances the litigation interests in compensation and access to justice of that first claimant. This
is true even if the two claimants’ litigation strategies and outcomes might differ, because of the
difference in claims, in (totally hypothetical) individual proceedings. The Court’s jurisprudence
on class unity is not attentive to the former conception of litigation interests—a conception that
takes into account the litigation interests in the aggregate proceeding and the relationship
between the aggregate proceeding, and the absent plaintiffs’ ability to obtain compensation and
access to justice. Instead, the definition of litigation interests is predicated on the individualistic,
“day-in-court” notion of litigation, a notion of how claims might be treated in individualized
proceedings (however unlikely such proceedings might be).
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vindicate claims in precisely the way this Article’s view of procedure
counsels against: when the claims of class members are unmarketable
individually315 and/or when the group of plaintiffs is characteristically
under-resourced, the absence of the class mechanism functionally
means the presence of insurmountable transaction costs to claiming.
Under this Article’s framework, then, one might offer the following
corrective to the collectivist conception of legal claims that would have
(over)remedied this problem: class claims (and their claimants)
constitute an entity if, as in the context of unmarketable claims and/or
characteristically under-resourced plaintiffs, each individual claim is
intertwined with the claims of others in the most fundamental sense.
There is no claim and there is no plaintiff without the unit; the
aggregate unit is the plaintiff.316
Freed from formalistic constraints but guided (and likewise
constrained) by the principles set forth in this Article, the certification
analysis would now explicitly take into account the value of the
majority of the claims in class, as well as the resources typical of the
parties. Further, such analysis might involve a comparison of the
relative alienability of claims on an individual basis versus a collective
basis.317 Neither prescription likely requires a change to Rule 23.318 If
the claims are low-value, and are not meaningfully alienable on an
individual basis, strict imposition of Rule 23 requirements directed at
preserving a fictive notion of strong individual ownership and use of
claims seem inappropriate at best. Here, inquiries regarding

315. See Cabraser, supra note 54 (tracing Judge Posner’s class action jurisprudence, which
determines the level of due process attendant a particular class claim based on considerations
like claim value).
316. In some respects, this is the notion David Shapiro was driving at in The Class as Party
and Client. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 938–39. Unlike Shapiro’s more formalistic conception of
the class as an entity, however, this Article takes the position that there are certain
circumstances in which the normative goals of our litigation system are served by encouraging
aggregate units; the fact that legal claims within that unit are interdependent on one another is
a feature of any given individual’s ownership of that claim, but it is not an absolute, or even
near-absolute, conception of either the class or the underlying class claims.
317. Such an analysis is not unheard of. The class of merchants in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant presented a similar analysis. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (explaining
no individual plaintiff’s claim was worth enough to justify the expense of the antitrust expert).
Whether factors like expert fees ought to be considered in the certification analysis, or are more
appropriately addressed (if at all) by, say, legislatures in crafting the contours of substantive
law, is a question beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief discussion of the ways in which
state legislatures have amended substantive laws to help plaintiffs avoid class certification
hurdles, see Glover, supra note 155.
318. Indeed, there is arguably a textual hook for this interpretive change in Rule 23. Rule 23
calls for courts to ask whether the class action is a superior vehicle for the resolution of claims—
an inquiry that already asks courts to compare class resolution versus individual resolution of
claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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commonality, typicality, and “unity”—as embodied in adequacy of
representation requirements319—are better redirected toward
alignment with procedure’s role in reducing transaction costs to
effectuating substantive rights.
Assume, however, that the specific regulatory prescriptions
above are not adopted. Indeed, assume further that its normative
underpinnings are rejected in favor of other concerns. Even then, the
potentially significant payoffs that the regulatory theory of legal
claims could generate for the class-certification debate in particular
and procedural theory more generally are not destroyed. Particularly
in light of the normative incoherence that results from formalist
conceptual frameworks illustrated in Part II, analysis of the classcertification problem under these new conditions perhaps more clearly
reveals the benefits of this Article’s theory for procedural
decisionmaking and design.
Along these lines, assume that the Court’s adoption of an
individualistic approach toward certification requirements is driven,
at least in part, by implicit concerns about the in terrorem effect of
class certification on defendants.320 When these in terrorem effects
actually occur—in other words, when dubious claims nonetheless yield
relatively high settlements from defendants—this result is no less
troubling for procedure’s role in effectuating claims than when
claiming is disabled. At the very least, such settlements constitute
error costs; they also represent a failure of procedure to “resolve
claims on the merits.”321 Approaching class certification analysis using
this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims would first lift the veil
on this normative trade-off by eliminating the formalist conceptual
language about plaintiffs’ individual autonomy.322
319. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 34, at 657 (arguing that the typicality and commonality
requirements collapse into the adequacy of representation requirement).
320. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International for one of the few cases in which
the Court explicitly sets forth reasons for disallowing class actions—namely, the in terrorem
effect on defendants. 559 U.S. 662, 663–65 (2010).
321. Glover, supra note 2, at Part II.
322. Indeed, to the extent the possibility of an in terrorem effect on defendants exists in any
given case, it would fit within this Article’s regulatory framework: the extraction of a nuisance
settlement (or worse) from a defendant has a negative effect on deterrence. Such a
determination, however, would necessarily have to rest on some measure of an evaluation of the
viability of plaintiffs’ legal theories, and their likelihood of success on those theories. The former
is an appropriate consideration at the time of certification; the latter is almost assuredly not.
See, e.g., Glover, supra note 155 (arguing that some of the Supreme Court’s recent class
certification decisions were driven by largely unspoken determinations about the viability of
plaintiffs’ legal theories; that these determinations are appropriate under Rule 23, Supreme
Court precedent, and the Rules Enabling Act; and that the Court has a duty to make these
determinations explicit); Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63
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Further, these transparency gains would have real
consequences. By requiring courts to make explicit the normative and
theoretical underpinnings of its approach to class certification, the
regulatory theory could in turn reveal either the need for other,
different, and possibly unseen regulatory steps. To the extent the
Court believes that class certification (and, perhaps, certification of
class actions involving low-value claims in particular323) imposes in
terrorem effects on defendants, the explicit expression of that concern
would draw attention to the need for regulations that address directly
the problem of nuisance settlements.324 For instance, although current
Supreme Court jurisprudence requires courts to engage in meritsbased inquiries when those inquiries overlap with certification
requirements,325 that has not led courts, including the Supreme Court,
to expressly evaluate whether plaintiffs’ underlying substantive
theories are legally cognizable.326 To illustrate, the Title VII class
claims in Dukes, as presented by the class, likely satisfy Rule 23
certification requirements (even as ratcheted up by the Court in that
same case). Under plaintiffs’ “conduit” theory of discrimination under
Title VII, there was a common question as to whether Wal-Mart’s
corporate
culture,
effectuated
through
discretion-based
decisionmaking, resulted in discrimination against women. For the
Court, there was an unstated preliminary question—whether Title VII
permitted proof of discrimination through a conduit theory. The Court
implicitly answered this preliminary question in the negative,
expressing its holding largely in procedural language under Rule
23(a). Had it been explicit about its Title VII conclusion, however, the
procedural consequences under Rule 23(a) would have followed

VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149 (2010) (counseling judges against conflating certification standards
with standards for summary judgment).
323. See Glover, supra note 155 (arguing that the Court’s class action arbitration
jurisprudence reflects a substantive judgment that certain types of class actions—like low-value
consumer class actions—are not worth facilitating because, among other reasons, they generate
in terrorem effects for defendants).
324. This call for the Court to regulate normative problems caused by, or intertwined with
particular procedures is not completely new. As Richard Nagareda has explained, the Court’s
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly constituted an attempt to regulate, through pleading
rules, normatively undesirable practices in the discovery process, a move he referred to as
“regulatory indirection.” Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex
Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 674 (2011).
325. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 n.6 (2011) (clarifying Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)).
326. Such evaluation occurred, but was not made explicit, about plaintiffs’ theory of Title
VII in Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360. See also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and
Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) (arguing that the Court’s decision in
Dukes involved numerous Title VII policy judgments).
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naturally and without much need for comment. The more direct
route—whereby the Court would have explained why, as a matter of
Title VII law, plaintiffs’ “common question” was not legally
cognizable—would have generated needed clarification in the
substantive law. It also would have provided a guide for lower courts
to likewise weed out legally impossible, and therefore unmeritorious,
suits at the certification stage—thereby reducing the number of suits
that may generate problematic in terrorem effects.
Alternatively, or in addition, the Rules Advisory Committee, or
more informally, the authors of the Manual for Complex Litigation,
could create a preliminary (and perhaps nonbinding) summaryjudgment-type procedure for issuing a merits-based opinion that
would follow quickly on the heels of class certification.327 This could
reduce a class’s leverage at the settlement table where claims are of
dubious merit, both by reducing factual information asymmetries
between the parties about claim value, and by reducing the level of
variance facing defendants in their settlement calculus.328
In the end, then, the regulatory theory of legal claims reveals
regulatory pathways for harmonizing the often competing normative
considerations at work. Freed from formalist constraints regarding the
conception of claims, assume first that the Court’s normative concerns
about in terrorem effects remain in place, and assume further that
mitigation of such effects is a theoretically valid procedural purpose.329
However, assume also that the Court accepts as descriptively accurate
the existence of normatively undesirable transaction-cost market
failure generated by stringent certification requirements in low-value
class actions. Explicit expression of the way in which normative
concerns about in terrorem effects actually dictate procedural doctrine
in turn highlights the need for direct regulation of those in terrorem
effects. Such direct regulation thereby potentially makes room for the

327. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 2, at 1730 (making a similar suggestion, though
introducing the possibility of financial penalties (e.g., the other party’s costs) for parties who
proceed with litigation after the issuance of an unfavorable preliminary judgment who then lose
in a binding judgment); Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 203
(suggesting the introduction of nonbinding evaluations of the merits of a case earlier in the
litigation process).
328. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 2, at 1732–34 (discussing how information asymmetries
and variance distort settlement values).
329. This Article does not address whether the generation of in terrorem effects for
defendants constitutes a market failure in the litigation system, nor whether it should be the
purpose of procedure to mitigate those effects. In prior work, however, I have argued that
procedure should seek to produce more accurate settlement values, in part by providing meritsbased assessments earlier in the litigation process, and particularly in class litigation involving
high levels of variance. Glover, supra note 2, at 1764–68.
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regulation of other important interests. Indeed, this approach opens
up a potential regulatory pathway for procedure to reduce transaction
cost barriers to claiming in the subset of class actions involving lowvalue claims. Along these lines, the specific regulatory prescriptions
set forth in this Section are of course not the only ones we could adopt.
Instead, as here, they illustrate the ways in which the regulatory
theory in this Article points in new and different directions for the
achievement of key normative goals of our litigation system.
***
Of course, there are possible alternatives to the problem of
transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights—
alternatives that likewise do not require reversion to formalist
conceptual frameworks. For instance, one could design a less
expensive system of dispute resolution and procedure where, ideally,
supplemental financing is unnecessary and unmarketable claims are
fewer, perhaps along the lines of the fast-track for claims in the
United Kingdom. Such ideas are the subject of future work and are
beyond the scope of this Article. As necessary as such reforms may be,
they are not likely to supplant our current system. Accordingly, they
would not replace, wholesale, this Article’s regulatory theory for
claims.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the ways in which long-standing
conceptual debates about legal claims and litigant autonomy that
occur within specific procedural contexts play out across the broad
swath of the litigation landscape. This cross-cutting analysis reveals
that formalist conceptions of legal claims as either individualistic or
collectivist cannot provide a coherent path toward resolving many of
the most difficult questions facing procedural decisionmaking in
particular and our litigation system in general.
Our approach to litigant autonomy therefore should not and
cannot derive from absolutist views. Instead, this Article offers a
theory for regulating individual autonomy over legal claims. Grounded
in principles of economic theory and litigation theory—as well as the
intellectual foundations of property underlying modern conceptions of
legal claims—this theory posits that litigant autonomy can be
regulated in appropriate circumstances, such as to reduce transactioncost market failures that impede the effectuation of substantive
rights. More than that, it is properly within the role and lawmaking
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power of the judiciary to engage in such regulation, including through
the use of procedural mechanisms. Operationalizing this Article’s
theory within the very procedural contexts that formalist conceptions
struggled to address, this Article’s theory points a way forward for
navigating the interrelationship of procedure, substantive rights, and
the ownership of claims in an increasingly complex litigation
landscape.

